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Abstract
This paper provides a general equilibrium evaluation of the Employment Service, also
known as the Public Labor Exchange (PLX), a national program which facilitates meet-
ings between job seekers and vacancies. The paper departs from the partial equilibrium
framework of previous evaluations by constructing a dynamic general equilibrium match-
ing model with the PLX as one search channel, and the other search channel comprising
all other search methods. The PLX is a directed search channel in the sense that searchers
are matched by skill levels. The model is calibrated to the U.S. PLX and to the U.S. la-
bor market and is used to compute general and partial equilibrium impacts of the PLX.
The ﬁndings are that (i) the partial equilibrium impacts are consistent with the empirical
literature, but diﬀerent from the general equilibrium ones; (ii) the standard assumption
in the evaluation literature, that outcomes for agents who do not participate in a program
are not directly aﬀected by the program, does not hold for the PLX; (iii) the hetero-
geneity across and within worker skill levels plays an important role when computing
aggregate impacts; and, (iv) equilibrium adjustments are driven by employers who post
more high-skill vacancies when both search channels operate.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J63, J64, J68, E24.
Keywords: Search Models, Program Evaluation, Public Employment Service, PLX,
General Equilibrium Impacts, Partial Equilibrium Impacts.
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11 Introduction
Government employment policies have shifted focus from a passive approach, such as unemploy-
ment insurance compensation, toward Active Labor Market Policy (ALMP) programs aimed
at improving the skills and job market readiness of their participants. Examples of ALMP pro-
grams include classroom training in occupational skills, job search assistance (JSA), subsidized
employment, or on-the-job training programs. Subsequently, a lot of work has been devoted to
measuring the impact of employment and training programs. We have learned a lot about the
substantive implications of the ALMP programs, as well as about the methodological challenges
involved with obtaining program impacts.
The evaluation literature estimates the impact of a program by comparing the outcomes
of program participants with the counterfactual outcomes that would have prevailed, had they
not participated. For the most part, this literature has focused on estimating the partial
equilibrium impacts of a program under the assumption that outcomes for non-participants are
not aﬀected by the operation of the program. This assumption is referred to as Stable Unit
Treatment Value Assumption, or “SUTVA.” While SUTVA may be reasonable for small-scale
programs, where indirect eﬀects are likely to be minimal, the partial equilibrium paradigm is
no longer appropriate for large programs which have the potential to aﬀect the outcomes of
other agents in the economy besides participants. For example, a program successful at ﬁnding
jobs for participants may do so at the expense of non-participants who would have obtained
those jobs had the program not displaced them. Firms may also react to such an employment
program by changing the number and skill mix of the vacancies they post.
The focus of this paper is on the Employment Service (ES), also known as the Public
Employment Service (PES), or as the Public Labor Exchange (PLX). The PLX is a large-scale
government-provided program which matches job searchers with vacancies. Each country has its
own version of the Public Employment Service/PLX program, to which respective governments
devote a signiﬁcant amount of resources.1 The United States spends 0.17% of GDP on the
PLX and Canada spends 0.21% of GDP. The fraction of GDP spent on ALMP programs is
1Throughout the paper, the Employment Service is referred to as the PLX, which is the preferred terminology
in the U.S., to which the model is calibrated. Other studies, especially European ones, may address the PLX
as ES or PES, but ultimately all terms refer to a similar program available in all OECD countries.
2higher for European countries in general. On the PLXs in particular, Sweden spends 0.25%
of GDP, the Netherlands spend 0.36% of GDP, Germany spends 0.22% of GDP, and the U.K.
spends 0.18%.2 Further evidence of the signiﬁcant scale of the PLX is seen from the very large
number of PLX users. Over the period 1997-1999, the average number of workers registered
on the PLX in the U.S. was 17.3 million each year; out of those, 11.2 million received “some
reportable service” and 7.1 million were “referred to employment.” In 1999, U.S. employers
posted 7.5 million vacancies on the PLX.3
This paper is the ﬁrst to provide a general equilibrium evaluation of the PLX. The contri-
bution of this general equilibrium evaluation is threefold. First, the paper shows that general
equilibrium adjustments are quantitatively important for the PLX as a large-scale program.
The partial equilibrium impacts of the PLX computed from the model conform in magnitude
with what has been documented elsewhere in the literature, and diﬀer from the general equilib-
rium impacts; moreover, contrary to the standard assumption in partial equilibrium evaluation
literature, the outcomes for agents who do not use the PLX actually do change because of
the PLX. Second, since relatively few evaluations have investigated the role and impact of the
PLX, the paper adds substantively to our understanding of the PLX as a labor market insti-
tution. Third, the model itself, while an extension of existing matching models set within the
Mortensen-Pissarides framework, such as Albrecht and Vroman (2002), provides new insights
into labor market adjustments from frictions on two search channels with diﬀerent matching
technologies. One search channel, the PLX, provides directed search to the extent that it help
sort workers and vacancies by skill level. The other search channel is a random matching chan-
nel, comprising all other search methods, but more eﬃcient at overall matching compared to
the PLX. In this sense, the results here provide a quantitative example of the impact of directed
search on wage inequality and welfare.4
The environment consists of unemployed workers who search for jobs and ﬁrms who post
vacancies on two separate channels: the PLX channel, and an “everything else” channel, or
2Source: Table 2 in Boone and van Ours (2004). Averages for 1985-1999. Also see OECD (2001) for
descriptions of the PLXs of most OECD countries; for instance Table 2 on page 51 lists how much each OECD
country spends on their PLX as percent of total GDP.
3U.S. Department Of Labor, Employment and Training Administration Annual Report 1999 ETA9002-C.
4Shi (2002) is a theoretical reference for the impact of directed search on inequality; unlike Shi’s model where
search is directed by the ﬁrms’ choice of the posted wage, here the directed search is embedded in the search
technology on the PLX channel.
3the “Informal” channel. In every period, workers and ﬁrms choose whether to search on the
Informal channel or on the PLX. Worker and ﬁrm heterogeneity is represented by two skill
levels, high and low. Matches between workers and ﬁrms are productive when the worker skill
endowments fall within the ﬁrm skill requirements. In order to model the operation of the PLX
in the search market, PLX staﬀ are assumed to separate workers and vacancies by skill level,
subject to some error.
This provides an element of directed search in the sense that the PLX is providing a screening
function that identiﬁes, up to an error margin, the worker and vacancy types. Workers and
vacancies then meet at random, but only within pools of similar types. The model is calibrated
with agents searching on both channels, such that statistics from the model match those for the
U.S. labor market and for the PLX along several dimensions, which include market tightness,
the skill mix of searchers and vacancies, and unemployment duration.5
The general equilibrium impacts of the PLX are computed from the following experiment:
the PLX is shut down and all agents are compelled to search on the Informal channel, the only
one still available in the experimental economy. The impact of the PLX is computed as the
diﬀerence in outcomes between the model economy, the one with both search channels available,
and the simulated one, with the PLX shut down. This is the appropriate thought experiment
since we are interested in the counterfactual outcome for PLX users in the absence of the PLX.
Potential general equilibrium eﬀects of the PLX stem from agents responding to the existence
of the PLX search channel. By allowing employers to react to changes in the labor market due
to the PLX, the number and skill mix of jobs and vacancies, and their duration, will change.
Likewise, the existence of the PLX as a search option will change the speed and type of vacancies
with which workers match. This aﬀects in turn not only equilibrium unemployment and wages,
but also the quality of matches, the welfare of workers and ﬁrms, and the labor productivity in
the economy, in ways that would not be apparent in a partial equilibrium setting.
In particular, the general equilibrium impacts indicate that, in the absence of the PLX,
high-skill workers would suﬀer a wage drop of 6.4% (this implies a positive wage impact of the
PLX, computed as the diﬀerence in the wage with and without the PLX), while low-skill workers
5Data for the calibration come from general labor surveys in the U.S., the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), the Current Population Survey (CPS), and the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), as
well as from public performance indicators for the PLX. Details on the calibration are provided in Section 5.
4would gain 1.5% in wages (a negative wage impact of the PLX). Unemployment durations are
found to increase by six weeks for high-skill workers and by 2.7 weeks for low-skill workers due
to the PLX.
The partial equilibrium impacts computed from the model show the PLX generating a
positive wage impact of about 1.6% on average and a small increase in the average duration of
unemployment of 1.66 weeks. For non-participants, whose impacts are assumed to be zero in
the standard partial equilibrium evaluation literature, the general equilibrium impacts indicate
that the PLX has a positive impact on the mean wage (an increase of 1.1%), together with an
impact of 1.6 weeks increase in the mean unemployment duration. Thus, partial equilibrium
impacts diﬀer from the general equilibrium ones in the case of large national programs. This
invites some caution when public policy is based on partial equilibrium estimates alone −
especially when considering heterogeneous impacts for various groups, high-skill and low-skill
workers in this case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives the institutional framework
of the PLX and discusses existing literature on its evaluation. Section 3 introduces the model
and solves for its equilibrium. Section 4 provides a link between the counterfactuals generated
from the experiments conducted in the model and the corresponding parameters of interest in
the program evaluation literature. Section 5 discusses the calibration procedure, and Section
6 presents the quantitative results for the general and partial equilibrium impacts. Section 7
concludes and oﬀers some possible extensions.
2 The Public Labor Exchange (PLX)
2.1 Institutional Framework
PLX services are universally available with little enforced participation for either workers or
ﬁrms. Job seekers have free access to listings of vacancies posted by employers and employer
contact technology (such as computers or fax machines), and may receive technical guidance for
preparing resumes. Unemployed individuals receiving unemployment insurance beneﬁts have
to register with the public agency, but their activity on the PLX is laxly monitored, if at all.6
6See for instance Anderson (2001) for evidence on the variation of search requirements and monitoring of
the unemployed across the U.S. Employment Agencies, who are responsible for the administration of the PLXs
5For employers, the PLX provides vacancy registration and referrals of potential employees at
little or no cost. Private ﬁrms are not mandated to list their vacancies on the PLX.
In order to match job seekers with employers, PLX computers run programs using client
and vacancy characteristics to deliver a set of job openings for a job seeker or to provide a pool
of qualiﬁed applicants for a vacancy. A referral entails a successful match by the PLX between
job seekers and open vacancies. Referrals are based on information provided by job seekers “as
is” without prior background checks by the PLX oﬃce. The relevant treatment considered here
is receiving a job referral from the PLX; to discount passive users, simply registering with the
PLX is not enough to be counted as treatment, unless a job referral results from of it.
2.2 Partial Equilibrium Evaluations of the PLX
2.2.1 Reduced-form Evaluations of the PLX
In the standard evaluation literature the impact of a program is measured in a reduced-form
framework, by comparing actual outcomes with the estimated counterfactual of what would
have happened to participants had they not participated, under the assumption that the
program does not disrupt or inﬂuence the outcomes of non-participants. While ALMP pro-
grams inn general have been subjected to numerous evaluations, both experimental and non-
experimental, we know very little about the impact of the PLX on the wages and employment
of its participants, despite the size and reach of public employment programs. Within this
literature, only three studies have attempted to measure the impact of the PLX on the employ-
ment and wages of its users: Johnson, Dickinson, and West (1985), Katz (1991), and Jacobson
and Petta (2000). This lack of knowledge comes in stark contrast with other ALMP programs,
including Job Search Assistance (JSA) programs, which usually are also administered by the
Employment Service.7
The three papers mentioned here focus on the U.S. PLX, and are set up in a standard
reduced-form partial equilibrium framework. The documented impact of the PLX in reducing
unemployment duration ranges from respectively 0.64 and 2.79 weeks of unemployment dura-
at the state level.
7See for instance the survey in O’Leary (2004) for more on the impact of JSA programs. One explanations
why PLX programs have not been suﬃciently evaluated is the fact that the PLX has universal access, which
precludes any sort of experimental evaluation. Another strand of related literature, discussed in the next section,
examines the impact of various job search methods, of which PLX could be one.
6tion reduction for men and women (Johnson, Dickinson, and West (1985) using 1980 data) to
1.1 and 2.1 weeks of unemployment duration reduction in the states of Washington and Oregon
(Jacobson and Petta (2000) using late-80s to mid-90s data). Similar modest impacts are doc-
umented for the wage outcomes, with men and women experiencing impacts of $-98 and $325
respectively over the six-month period following PLX intervention (Johnson, Dickinson, and
West (1985)). These papers have neither generated a consensus regarding the role of the PLX
in the labor market nor identiﬁed channels or mechanisms through which the PLX is helping
(or not) its users.
2.2.2 Partial Equilibrium Search Models of the PLX
The other existing literature related to the PLX comes from partial equilibrium search models
that investigate the eﬀectiveness of various job-search strategies, including the PLX. Implicit
in most reduced-form partial equilibrium studies is a model that takes the distribution of job
openings as given and has job seekers choosing an optimal mix from a set of available job search
methods: the PLX, networks of friends, direct employer contacts, newspaper ads, or private
placement agencies.8 van Ours (1993) and Lindeboom, van Ours, and Renes (1994) argue that,
compared to other search strategies, the Dutch PLX appears eﬃcient for unemployed searchers.
This is because employed searchers, who appear to search more eﬀectively, use the PLX less
than other channels, leaving unemployed searchers to face less competition on this channel.
A similar argument is made by Fougere, Pradel, and Roger (2006) within the framework of
a partial equilibrium search model with exogenous arrival rates of vacancies and endogenous
search intensity. Despite the PLX lowering the search intensity, an exogenous increase in
8One documented characteristic of PLX clients compared to workers who use other search methods is that
PLX searchers are often low skilled and face serious barriers to re-employment (Bishop (1993) for the U.S, van
Ours (1993) for the Netherlands, Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) for England, and Adison and Portugal (2002)
for Portugal.); they may also receive lower wages upon ﬁnding employment (Cohen and Stevens (1989) for the
U.S. and Osberg (1993) for Canada). This is consistent with PLX data which shows 89% of PLX users do not
have post-secondary education, while in the population 61% of workers (and 75% of unemployed searching for
a job) do not have post-secondary education. On the ﬁrm side, the literature examines the impact of diﬀerent
recruiting strategies on the time elapsed until vacancies are ﬁlled. From this literature it is not immediately
apparent whether workers hired using other channels are more or less productive than workers hired through the
PLX. Employers become more selective in the hiring procedures as the required levels of age, education, starting
wages, and experience rise (Burdett and Cunningham (1998)). The PLX can help by providing a pre-screening
service, facilitating contacts between workers and jobs with similar skills. This is consistent with van Ours and
Ridder (1993) who argue that vacancy durations consist mostly of interviewing time, or Roper (1988) who ﬁnds
the British PLX to be a faster recruiting channel than newspaper ads.
7the arrival rate of vacancies would translate into an increase in exits from unemployment,
proportionately larger for the low skill. Also related to the PLX, its crowding-out eﬀect has
been documented by Davidson and Woodbury (2000) in a chapter in the Jacobson and Petta
(2000) study. The role of the PLX in the labor market is also modeled as changing the search
intensity, thus reducing the job search cost for workers. With search cost parameters calibrated
to wage and unemployment duration targets coming from the partial equilibrium estimates in
Jacobson and Petta (2000) they ﬁnd some reduction, although not too large, in the outcomes
of non-users due to displacement. The role of the PLX in changing the search intensity, thus
reducing the job search cost for workers, has also been modeled by Davidson and Woodbury
(2000) in a chapter in the Jacobson and Petta (2000) study. Furthermore, Davidson and
Woodbury (2000) document some reduction in the outcomes of non-users due to displacement
by PLX users.9
While partial equilibrium search models bring important insights into the operation of the
PLX and provide a useful benchmark for the partial equilibrium impacts of the PLX, they
can miss important general equilibrium adjustments, such as the interaction between workers’
search strategies and the vacancy-posting response of employers.10 In the case of the PLX,
the partial equilibrium assumption is very likely to be violated, given the large scale of the
program − and indeed the quantitative results from the model reveal that the general and
partial equilibrium impacts are very diﬀerent.
3 The Model
Set within the Mortensen-Pissarides matching framework, the model departs from standard
matching models by allowing two separate search channels on which workers and ﬁrms can
9Blundel, Dias, Meghir, and van Reenen (2004) also investigate the displacement eﬀect (which they call
“substitution”) of the U.K. New Deal program, and cannot reject the null hypothesis of displacement eﬀects.
Their identiﬁcation strategy is based on regional variation and diﬀerences between individuals eligible and
ineligible for the program, assuming that the macro characteristics across regions (such as unemployment) are
neither inﬂuenced by the program nor by diﬀerential external shocks.
10The very few papers which have approached program evaluation in a general equilibrium framework include
Davidson and Woodbury (1993) and Lise, Seitz, and Smith (2004) who look at the displacement implications
of programs oﬀering bonus incentives for quitting unemployment or welfare; Heckman, Lochner, and Taber
(1998) who account for the general equilibrium price adjustments of a universal tuition policy; and Albrecht,
van den Berg, and Vroman (2005) who account for the skill acquisition of participants in a Swedish training
program. Another trend in structural program evaluation, e.g. Wolpin and Todd (2006), uses experimental
data to validate the behavioral implications of a structural model.
8interact: the PLX and the “Informal” channel that combines all other search channels.11 There
is heterogeneity in worker and ﬁrm types, with an equilibrium distribution of searcher and
vacancy types on the two channels. The general and partial equilibrium impacts of the PLX
are quantiﬁed for outcomes which include employment, vacancies, wages, output, and a welfare
measure embedded in value functions.
The model is set up in discrete time. Workers and ﬁrms are inﬁnitely lived. Each period,
workers and ﬁrms choose a search channel. Only unemployed workers search for jobs. Search
costs are diﬀerent for workers and ﬁrms across channels. The matching technology on the two
channels is diﬀerent in the sense that the PLX provides a pre-screening service for potential
employers.
Heterogeneity is introduced by postulating two skill types: high and low. The distribution
of worker skills is given exogenously. Each worker knows his/her own skill. Based on skill
and labor market conditions, unemployed workers choose each period the search channel. The
distribution of vacancy skill requirements is determined endogenously. Ex-ante identical ﬁrms
decide whether to open a vacancy or not. The model only allows for one vacancy per ﬁrm. If
the ﬁrm decides to open a vacancy, it also chooses the job skill requirement for the vacancy
and on which channel to post it.
As in Albrecht and Vroman (2002), the productivity of a match is asymmetric: high-skill
jobs can be ﬁlled only by high-skill workers, while low-skill jobs can be ﬁlled by either high-skill
or low-skill workers. The productivity of a vacancy is determined by its skill requirement. A
low-skill vacancy has the same productivity once ﬁlled, regardless of whether it is operated by a
high-skill or a low-skill worker. High-skill positions are more productive, but also more diﬃcult
to ﬁll, since low-skill workers are of no use to high-skill ﬁrms.12
Let subscript j denote the search channel, with j = {1,2}, where the Informal channel is
subscripted by 1 and the PLX channel is subscripted by 2. Workers are of skill type x, high
11Other search channels include direct employer contacts, agents’ personal connections, newspaper ads, etc.
12Albrecht and Vroman (2002) call the equilibrium with high-skill workers working in both type of jobs “cross-
skill equilibrium” and the equilibrium with high-skill workers working only in high-skill jobs “segmented-skill
equilibrium.” Following empirical evidence from workers’ education and wages, my focus here is on the cross-
skill equilibrium. Also note that, while I focus on an equilibrium where there is a mass of workers and vacancies
on each channel, I cannot rule out the possibility of multiple equilibria, where workers and/or vacancies could
segregate on one or the other search channel. More details on the corner solutions are provided in Section 3.6
and also in the Appendices.
9(x = H) or low (x = L). Vacancies have a skill requirement y, high (y = H) or low (y = L).
Each period, unemployed workers decide on which channel to search for a job and ﬁrms decide
on which channel to post a vacancy. Productive matches continue until exogenously destroyed.
There are two diﬀerent exogenous job destruction rates for high-skill and for low-skill jobs, δH
and δL. Agents discount the future at rate β. Wages are determined by workers and ﬁrms
splitting the surplus of a productive match in a symmetric Nash bargaining framework.
3.1 The Worker’s Problem
Unemployed workers receive per period beneﬁts b. These beneﬁts can be seen as an aggregate
measure of home production, value of extra leisure, and unemployment compensation. The
cost of search cj is the same for high-skill and low-skill unemployed workers, but may diﬀer
across search channels.
The unemployment value for a type x worker searching on channel j, is given by:


















for j = {1,2}, x = {H,L}
where pjt(x,y) is the per-period probability that an unemployed worker of skill x meets a
vacancy of skill requirement y on channel j. Ut+1(x) is the period t+1 value of unemployment
for a type x worker. It is independent of the channel choice j because workers have the option
of choosing the search channel at the beginning of every period. Therefore, Ut+1(x) is given by:
Ut+1(x) = max
j={1,2}
{Ujt+1(x)} for x = {H,L}.
Given the choice of a search channel each period, it must be the case that the value of unem-
ployment is the same on both channels, U1t(x) = U2t(x) = Ut(x).
When employed, workers receive per period wage compensation wjt(x,y) and face the ex-
ogenous probability δy of losing their job and becoming unemployed. The value of a job match
for a worker of type x whose search on channel j has succeeded in ﬁnding a job of skill y is:
Wjt(x,y) = wjt(x,y) + β [(1 − δ
y)Wjt+1(x,y) + δ
y Ut+1(x)],
for j = {1,2}, x = {H,L}, y = {H,L}. (2)
103.2 The Firm’s Problem
A ﬁrm can post either high-skill y = H or low-skill y = L vacancies. The cost of posting a
vacancy of skill requirement y on channel j is kj(y). The value of opening a vacancy of skill
requirement y on channel j is given by:


















for j = {1,2}, y = {H,L}
where qjt(x,y) is the probability that a vacancy of skill requirement y meets an unemployed
worker of type x searching on channel j in period t. Jjt+1(x,y) is the ﬁrm’s value from a
productive match between a skill y vacancy posted on channel j meeting a type x worker in




Like in the worker case, the choice of a posting channel implies that the value of vacancy must
be the same on either channel, and therefore the subscript j may be omitted from the value
function. When ﬁrst opening a vacancy, the ﬁrm decides its type. Assign to the initial skill
choice the value V0 = maxy={H,L}{V0(y)}.
The technology is such that the output of a productive match is the job skill requirement,
as long as the worker skill is at least as high as the job skill requirement, otherwise no output
is produced:
f(x,y) = f(y) if x ≥ y,
0 if x < y.
If productive, a ﬁlled vacancy generates for the ﬁrm:
Jjt(x,y) = f(y) − wjt(x,y) + β {(1 − δ
y)Jjt+1(x,y) + δ
y V0}
for j = {1,2}, x = {H,L}, y = {H,L} (4)
where δy is the probability of an exogenous job destruction for a job of productivity y.
113.3 Wage Determination
Every period, on each channel j = {1,2}, the net surplus from a job match between a type x
worker and a skill y vacancy, Sj(x,y) = [Wjt(x,y) − Ut(x)] + [Jjt(x,y) − Vt(y)], is split by a
Nash bargaining rule, giving wages wjt(x,y) as the solution to:
max[Wjt(x,y) − Ut(x)]
s[Jjt(x,y) − Vt(y)]
1−s, for x = {H,L}, y = {H,L},
where s is the worker’s bargaining power. The maximization implies:
(1 − s)[Wjt(x,y) − Ut(x)] = s[Jjt(x,y) − Vt(y)], for x = {H,L}, y = {H,L}. (5)
3.4 Steady-state Flow Conditions
To simplify notation, I anticipate here an equilibrium feature of the model, stationarity. Since
only steady-state equilibrium quantities are of interest, the t subscripts can be suppressed
from all deﬁnitions, including value functions and equilibrium unemployment, employment and
vacancies.
Let uH denote the number of high-skill unemployed and uL the number of low-skill unem-
ployed. Let ujH and ujL be the number of high-skill and low-skill unemployed on channel j,
where j = {1,2}. The number of high-skill and low-skill employed from channel j is respec-
tively ejH = ejHH + ejHL and ejL = ejLL, where being employed from channel j means the
worker and ﬁrm were searching on channel j when they met and agreed to enter the productive
relationship.13
For each worker type x = {H,L} on each channel j = {1,2} the number of employed
individuals of skill x who become unemployed after working in a job y is equal to the number
of unemployed individuals of skill x who ﬁnd a job y, resulting in the following ﬂow conditions:
ej(x,y) = ujx
pj(x,y)
δy for j = {1,2}, x = {H,L}, y ≤ x (6)
where pj(x,y) is the probability that a worker of type x meets a vacancy of skill requirement y
while searching on channel j. Since there are no productivity dynamics, there are no incentives
13Although they represent stocks, the employment measures are denoted by small letters to avoid confusion
with value functions, which are denoted by capital letters. The total number of unemployed on channel j is
ujH +ujL. The total number employed from the Informal channel is e1HH +e1HL +e1LL, while from the PLX
it is e2HH +e2HL+e2LL. A high-skill worker in a high-skill job eHL faces a lower job destruction probability δH
compared to a high-skill worker in a low-skill job eHL facing a job destruction probability of δL. The high-skill
labor force is eH + uH, and the low-skill labor force is eL + uL.
12for workers or vacancies to switch between search channels in equilibrium and, therefore, there
are no equilibrium ﬂows of either workers or vacancies between the two channels.
There are two more equations, one equation which normalizes the total labor force to one:
X
j={1,2}, x={H,L}
ejx + ujx = 1, (7)
and another equation derived from the exogenous distribution of skill types η:14
X
j={1,2}
ejH + ujH = η. (8)
3.5 Matching Technology




















The existence of a matching function is prompted by the spatial and/or temporal frictions in
the labor market that hamper meetings between workers and employers. Denote by Mj(uj,vj)
the number of random meetings generated in a market where uj workers and vj vacancies are
searching for a match.
The meeting technology is homogeneous of degree one in u and v, increasing and concave
in both arguments.16 The most commonly used functional form for the meeting technology
14Only the overall fraction of high-skilled labor force is exogenous. The fraction of high-skilled and low-skilled
unemployed searching on each channel is endogenous.
15Market tightness can be deﬁned separately for high-skill and for low-skill, or jointly for both skills. The
joint deﬁnition provided here is some weighted average of the separate tightness for high- and low-skill. Separate
tightness measures by skill level will be used when describing matching on the PLX channel.
16The decision of a worker to search for a job generates two opposing externalities. On the one hand, the more
workers searching for a job, the easier for a ﬁrm to ﬁll a vacancy. On the other hand, the more workers searching,
13M(u,v) is Cobb-Douglas, because it performs well when taken to the data − see for instance
the survey in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). To ensure that the meeting probabilities are
in the (0,1) interval, I follow den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) and use a slightly diﬀerent





















= m(θj) · uj
where θj =
vj
uj is the overall market tightness on channel j = {1,2}, α ∈ (0,1) is a matching






The matching eﬃciency parameter λ is going to be important in the calibrated version of the
model. Because the PLX provides a sorting service by skill level, it is obviously an attractive
mechanism. The calibrated equilibrium will have a measure of individuals and vacancies of
each skill on both channels. To achieve a distribution that is consistent with observable data,
some matching advantage must be allowed for the Informal channel, otherwise all workers and
vacancies might migrate on the PLX channel.18 Since it is only the relative matching eﬃciency
that matters, the matching eﬃciency for channel 2 is set to one, λ2 ≡ 1, while the value for
the matching eﬃciency λ1 is determined in calibration. While in principle the calibration could
pick a parameter λ1 < 1, for the reason outlined above we should expect a value of λ1 > 1.
3.5.1 Meeting on the Informal Channel
The probability that a worker of skill level x meets a vacancy of skill requirement y does not
depend on the worker skill x, since the matching is random and all workers have the same
chance of meeting a vacancy. High-skill and low-skill workers are equally likely to meet a
the more diﬃcult it is for a worker to meet with a vacancy. If the eﬀect of these two externalities cancels out,
then it can be argued that the matching technology only depends on the ratio of searching workers to posted
vacancies, therefore justifying the widely-held assumption that the matching function exhibits constant returns
to scale.
17In a continuous time setting this would not be an issue, since the rates of contact computed in the continuous
case do not have to lie between 0 and 1.
18An equilibrium with matching eﬃciencies set to 1 on both channels could not be calibrated to match
statistics in the data, for reasonable values of the probabilities that the PLX misidentiﬁes worker and vacancy
skills.
14high-skill vacancy p1(H,H) = p1(L,H) and, likewise, they are equally likely to meet a low-skill
vacancy p1(H,L) = p1(L,L). The probability for a low-skill worker to meet a high-skill vacancy
p1(L,H) is irrelevant, since such a productive match will never form.
Reciprocally, the probability that a vacancy of skill requirement y meets a worker of skill
level x does not depend on the job skill requirement y. A high-skill vacancy and a low-skill
vacancy are equally likely to meet a high-skill worker q1(H,H) = q1(H,L), or equally likely to
meet a low-skill worker q1(L,H) = q1(L,L). As before, q1(L,H) is irrelevant since a low-skill
worker x = L does not generate any positive output when in a high-skill job y = H.







= m(θ1)(1 − φ1) (9)






= m(θ1) φ1 (10)




















3.5.2 Meeting on the PLX Channel
On the PLX channel, the meeting technology is assortative to the extent that PLX personnel
refer high-skill workers to high-skill vacancies and low-skill workers to low-skill vacancies. While
it is assumed that PLX personnel do the best they can to match job seekers and vacancies by
their respective characteristics, there is room for error.19 Subject to the identiﬁcation error, the
PLX separates workers and vacancies on the PLX channel into two markets, or pools, one for
high-skill matches and one for low-skill matches. The eﬀective number of workers and vacancies
searching on the PLX channel is given not by their true type, but by how the PLX perceives
the skill type.
Let dw be the probability that the PLX mistakenly identiﬁes the type of a worker, and dv
the probability that the PLX mistakenly identiﬁes the type of a vacancy. Denoting by tilde the
19Mistakes from PLX staﬀ in identifying skills can be genuine, either accidental or because the workers
attempt to misrepresent their qualiﬁcations. One could also imagine that PLX staﬀ, attempting to manipulate
referral and placement statistics, on which their own job performance may be assessed, could willfully “mistake”
worker skills or job requirements.
15eﬀective measures for workers and vacancies on the PLX, the following identities hold:
e u2H = (1 − dw)u2H + dwu2L and e u2L = dwu2H + (1 − dw)u2L,
e v2H = (1 − dv)v2H + dvv2L and e v2L = dvv2H + (1 − dv)v2L.
A high-skill worker on the PLX is referred to a high-skill vacancy either if the PLX correctly
identiﬁes both the worker and the vacancy as high-skill types, or if the PLX misidentiﬁes both
the worker and the vacancy as low-skill types. The probability that a worker of skill x = H
searching on the PLX channel is referred to a vacancy of skill y = H is therefore the sum of
two terms. The ﬁrst term is the probability that the x = H worker is correctly identiﬁed, times
the number of matches per searcher in the H pool, times the probability that the matched
vacancy from the H pool is also correctly identiﬁed as a y = H vacancy. Likewise, the second
term is the probability that the x = H worker is misidentiﬁed as low-skill, times the number
of matches per searcher in the L pool, times the chance that the matched vacancy from the L
pool happens to be a misidentiﬁed y = H vacancy:













where f M2H is the meeting function on the PLX pool identiﬁed as high-skill and f M2L is the
meeting function on the PLX pool identiﬁed as low-skill. Likewise, the probability that a
worker of skill x = H,L searching on the PLX channel is referred to a low-skill y = L vacancy
is:


























The same applies on the vacancy side: vacancies are matched with the same worker type if the
vacancy and the worker are either both correctly identiﬁed or both misidentiﬁed. Vacancies are
matched with the opposite worker type if either one is misidentiﬁed. This leads to the following
meeting probabilities:











































for x = {H,L},
where e u2x is the number of unemployed identiﬁed by the PLX as having skill x = {H,L} and
e v2y is the number of vacancies identiﬁed by the PLX as having skill requirement y. Using these
eﬀective quantities, the meeting functions on the PLX channel, homogeneous of degree one and
increasing in their arguments, have the same functional form as the meeting function on the
Informal channel:
f M2x(e θ2x) =
e u2x · e v2x
(e u2x










· e u2x =
1





= e m2x · e u2x,





α , α ∈ (0,1) a matching parameter, and dw and dv respectively the fraction
of searching workers and vacancies misidentiﬁed by the PLX.20
Appendix I presents formulas for meeting probabilities on the PLX channel, where the usual
quantities − “true” measures of high and low-skilled unemployed workers and vacancies and
market tightness on the PLX channel − are replaced with the “eﬀective” measures described
above, e u2x, e v2x and e θ2x.
3.6 Equilibrium
The recursive steady-state equilibrium is an array {U,Wj,V,Jj,wj,pj,qj} such that:
20Note that the matching eﬃciency parameter λ2 has been omitted from the formula, since it is being nor-
malized to 1 in any case.
171. Given wj,pj,and qj, the value functions solve the Bellman equations corresponding to
workers’ and ﬁrms’ maximizing behavior.
2. Free entry implies that the value of all open vacancies is zero.
3. Steady-state ﬂow conditions hold on each channel.
4. Given value functions U, Wj, V , and Jj, wages are determined as a Nash bargaining
outcome.
5. Expectations about meeting probabilities are realized in equilibrium.
Upon a meeting between a type x worker and a skill requirement y vacancy, a productive
match is formed if and only if the match can generate a positive surplus in present value
discounted terms. In equilibrium, this implies that the value of the job match is positive, since
free entry drives the value of a vacancy to zero: J(x,y) > 0, or, equivalently, that the present
value of working is higher than the present value of being unemployed: W(x,y) > U(x).
Productive matches between low-skill workers and high-skill vacancies have been ruled out
by the production function assumption. Low-skill workers always engage in productive matches
with low-skill vacancies upon meeting such vacancies, and high-skill workers always engage in
productive matches with high-skill vacancies. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the focus here
is on the equilibrium where high-skill workers also engage in productive matches upon meeting
low-skill vacancies.21
There are several possible ways for workers and vacancies to interact on the two search
channels. Because it is the equilibrium observed in the real world, the model is calibrated
to the interior solution where workers and vacancies of both types search on both channels;
I call this the full-mixing equilibrium. The solution is discussed in the following Section 3.7.
Full details of the derivations, together with formulas for all other quantities of interest, are
presented in Appendix II.
21Albrecht and Vroman (2002) allow for two type of equilibria, “cross-skill” (the one considered here) and
“segmented-skill”, an equilibrium outcome where high-skill workers produce only in high-skill jobs. For them
the two type of equilibria is essential as the purpose of their paper is to show that using a Mortensen-Pissarides
matching framework together with a particular production technology can explain income inequality, both
within (w(H,H) > w(H,L)) and between (w(H,L) > w(L,L)) skill groups. Here, segmented-skill matching is
just a potential extension, whose equilibrium solution is available from the author upon request.
18Three other possible equilibria are discussed in detail in Appendices III and IV: a separation
case, when all workers and vacancies choose to migrate on the informal search channel; the
reciprocal case, when all agents ﬁnd it optimal to migrate on the PLX search channel; and,
ﬁnally, a partial mixing case, when high-skill workers search only on the Informal channel and
low-skill workers search only on the PLX.22
These other equilibria are interesting not only for theoretical purposes, but also for the
quantitative implications of the analysis, since the diﬀerent experiments performed on the full-
mixing model may result in some of the equilibria described here.
3.7 Solving for a Stationary Equilibrium
The solution to the model comes from the following conditions: the surplus from a productive
match is split by the Nash bargaining rule; employment is worthwhile for workers W > U
(accounting for the outside option of an employed worker); and employment is worthwhile
for vacancies J > V = 0 (accounting for the outside option of a ﬁlled vacancy). Finally,
equilibrium stationarity ﬂow conditions are used to compute other quantities of interest such
as wages, employment, and unemployment for each skill type on each search channel.
The system of equations for solving each model can be reduced to three equations in three
unknowns: market tightness (θ), fraction of low- skill unemployed (γ), and fraction of low-skill
vacancies (φ). In particular, in the baseline case of a mixing equilibrium (workers of both
skills searching on both channels), the equilibrium conditions can be reduced to a system of
equations in six unknowns: the market tightness on both search channels, θ1 and θ2; the fraction
of low-skill vacancies, φ1 and φ2; and the fraction of unemployed low-skill searchers, γ1 and γ2.
3.7.1 Vacancies and Workers Choose to Engage in Production upon Meeting
By substituting the free entry condition V (y) = 0 in the value of a productive match for a ﬁrm,




22The possibility of multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out. Because of the complicated nonlinearities in-
troduced by the matching technology on the PLX channel, a closed-form solution is impossible to obtain for
any equilibrium. Furthermore, no analytical conditions can be derived that would allow to separate regions of
the parameter space consistent with only one or another type of equilibrium. The behavioural implications of
the separating and partial mixing equilibria are summarized not only by equilibrium outcomes, but also by the
inequalities that need to be satisﬁed for these limiting cases to occur, as described in the Appendices.
19where for simplicity I denote By = 1 − β + βδy. On the worker side, stationarity in the value
of a productive match for the worker, equation (2), implies:
Wj(x,y) B
y = U(x)βδ
y + wj(x,y). (20)
Substituting for free entry V (y) = 0 in the Nash bargaining rule (5) and replacing the expres-









or, after some manipulation,
f(y) − wj(x,y) = (1 − s)[f(y) − (1 − β)U(x)]. (21)
Since the outside option of a worker in a productive match U(x) does not depend on the
channel where the match occurred, it follows that in equilibrium the value of unemployment,
and therefore the wages paid to a type x worker in a skill y job, must be the same across each
channel: wj(x,y) ≡ w(x,y).
There are three wages being paid in equilibrium: w(H,H), w(H,L), and w(L,L). High-skill
workers in low-skill jobs receive a diﬀerent wage than low-skill workers in the same job because
they have a diﬀerent outside option of being unemployed, U(H) 6= U(L). High-skill workers
in high-skill jobs receive a higher wage than high-skill workers in low-skill jobs because the
productivity of high-skill jobs is higher f(H) > f(L).23








[f(y) − (1 − β)U(x)]. (22)
Since workers and ﬁrms can choose what channel to use, the present discounted values of a
match for the worker Wj(x,y) or for the ﬁrm Jj(x,y) have to be the same on each channel,
Wj(x,y) ≡ W(x,y) and Jj(x,y) ≡ J(x,y). Therefore, in equilibrium all value functions, as
well as wages, are the same across the two search channels.
23Note that, since U(x) does not depend on the job skill requirement y, (21) implies that w(H,H)−w(H,L) =
s(f(H) − f(L). It shows that the wage premium for a high-skill worker in a high-skill job relative to the low-
skill job is the worker’s share of the productivity diﬀerences between the high- and low-skill jobs.
203.7.2 Outside Option: Employment Value for the Worker
Given that productive matches are formed upon meeting, the value of a job is higher than
the value of unemployment and thus max[U(x),W(x,y)] = W(x,y). Re-writing equation (1)
by substituting max[U(x),W(x,y)] = W(x,y) and then replacing W(x,y) − U(x) with the
corresponding expressions from (20) and (21) we get:









for j = {Informal,PLX}, x = {H,L}
If channel j is chosen by type x worker, the condition that workers form a productive match
upon meeting a vacancy on channel jgives the following value of unemployment:
(1 − β)U(x) =










for j = {1,2}, x = {H,L} (23)
3.7.3 Outside Option: Employment Value for the Firm
Under the assumption that there are no corner solutions in terms of no vacancies being oﬀered
(i.e. the value of a vacancy is not negative) equation (4) can be re-written using the condition
that the value of a vacancy is zero in a free entry equilibrium. Substitute V (y) = 0 and
expression (22) for J(x,y) in the value of a vacancy given by equation (4):





By [f(y) − (1 − β)U(x)]
for j = {1,2}, y = {H,L} (24)
Equations (23) and (24) give the interior equilibrium solution. Appendix II presents details
for deriving the implicit form solution after U(H) and U(L) have been eliminated between
the above equations. Having solved for the equilibrium θj, φj and γj, the stationarity ﬂow
conditions (6), (7) and (8) give the other equilibrium quantities of interest: wages, employment
and unemployment, and the output produced Y . Their respective expressions are given in
Appendix II.1.
214 Parameters of Interest in the General Equilibrium Eval-
uation of the PLX
In the present formulation, “treatment” for the worker means receiving a job referral from PLX
staﬀ; for the ﬁrm, it means listing a vacancy on the PLX. Workers and ﬁrms self-select into
treatment by choosing whether to use the PLX search channel or the Informal channel.
To compute the counterfactual outcome (what would have happened had the worker or
the ﬁrm not received the PLX “treatment”) the thought experiment is to have the worker,
or the ﬁrm, search on the Informal channel instead. Because of the large size of the PLX,
however, a general equilibrium counterfactual should take into account all adjustments that
would happen if all searchers were to move on the Informal channel instead. In other words,
the correct general equilibrium counterfactual needed to determine the role of the PLX in the
labor market would be to have the PLX shut down and see how equilibrium quantities would
change in a world where the PLX did not operate. By contrast, the thought experiment for the
partial equilibrium impact takes a marginal agent from the PLX and determines what would
have happened to this one agent had s/he gone to the Informal channel instead, while assuming
that the outcomes on the Informal channel remain unchanged. While relevant as a marginal
impact, the partial equilibrium result does not take into account all the adjustments that occur
in the economy due to the PLX, and therefore is not the appropriate answer for the impact of
the PLX for workers and ﬁrms.
In the spirit of Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998b), I describe how the usual evaluation
parameters from a partial equilibrium analysis translate into the PLX general equilibrium
framework. The deﬁnitions below refer separately to each of the skill-match groups. Usual
outcomes in evaluations are wages and unemployment durations.
1. Y1|PLX is the treatment outcome conditional on being treated. It is the outcome
observed for PLX participants. It can be computed immediately from the general equilibrium
model.
2. Y0|Informal is the no treatment outcome conditional on not being treated. It is the
outcome observed for participants on the Informal channel. It can be computed immediately
from the general equilibrium model.
223. Y0|PLX is the no treatment outcome conditional on being treated. It is the counterfac-
tual outcome for PLX participants had they entered the Informal channel instead. In general
equilibrium, it can be computed by following PLX participants in a simulation with the PLX
channel shut down. In partial equilibrium, it can be computed as the outcome for a similar
type agent searching on the Informal channel in the model economy.
4. Y1|Informal is the treatment outcome conditional on not being treated. It is the
counterfactual outcome for participants on the Informal channel had they entered the PLX
channel instead. In general equilibrium, it can be computed following participants on the
Informal channel in a simulation with the Informal channel shut down. In partial equilibrium,
it can be computed as the outcome for a similar type agent searching on the PLX channel in
the model economy.
5. Y1 is the average treatment outcome. It is the outcome for searchers on either channel
(any random person in the population) had they entered the PLX channel. In general equilib-
rium, it can be computed as the outcome in a simulation with only the PLX available and the
Informal channel shut down. In partial equilibrium, it can be computed as a weighted average
of outcomes from the PLX weighted by the skill distribution in the economy.
6. Y0 is the no treatment outcome. It is the outcome for searchers on either channel
(any random person in the population) had they entered the Informal channel. In general
equilibrium, it can be computed as the average outcome in a simulation with only the Informal
channel available and the PLX channel shut down. In partial equilibrium, it can be computed
as a weighted average of outcomes from the Informal channel weighted by the skill distribution
in the economy.
Treatment on the treated (TT) is perhaps the most interesting parameter for evaluators,
because it gives the impact of the program for a participant. It measures the eﬀect of a
program on a random participant (PLX), TT = E[(Y1 − Y0)|PLX] = E[Y1|PLX − Y0|PLX].
This parameter can be computed as the diﬀerence in average outcomes for PLX participants
between the general equilibrium model (with both channels populated) and the simulation
where the PLX channel is shut down and everybody is induced to search on the Informal
channel. The simulation produces the counterfactual outcome for program participants had
23the PLX not been available.24
Outcomes are computed from the model economy and from the two simulations with each
search channel shut down one at a time. Two main categories of parameters can be generated
from simulations: a full general equilibrium version of the treatment parameters, where all
quantities are allowed to adjust; and a partial equilibrium version where prices (wages in this
case) are held ﬁxed.
5 Calibration
5.1 The Deﬁnition of Skill
Workers are separated into two groups, high-skill and low-skill, based on education, experience
and wages. The model generates three types of wages: two for high-skill workers – in high-skill
and in low-skill jobs – and one for low-skill workers in low-skill jobs. The empirical procedure
also has to identify three skill categories: high-skill workers with high wages w(H,H), high-skill
workers with low wages w(H,L), and low skill workers who can only earn the low-skill wage
w(L,L), where w(H,H) > w(H,L) > w(L,L). In order to identify these three skill groups in
the data, the empirical analysis uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1996
to 1999, and proceeds along the following steps:25
(i) Generate the predicted wage from a Mincer wage regression using the PSID data with
controls for education categories and for labor market experience. These controls are used
since I want to compute the wage thresholds oﬀ a smoothened expected wage where the
most important predictors are education and experience.
(ii) Investigate the distribution of the predicted wage. A plot from a 50 bin histogram is
used and, given how the histogram is shaped, the following quantiles for the wage skill
distribution are chosen: top 14 bins for the HH workers, middle 8 bins for the HL workers,
24There are other parameters of interest in the evaluation literature. For instance, the Average Treatment
Eﬀect (ATE) parameter is deﬁned as the impact of a program on a random individual from the population,
ATE = E[Y1 − Y0]. In the general equilibrium framework, this would translate into the diﬀerence in mean
outcomes between the simulation when all agents enter the PLX channel and the simulation when all agents
enter the Informal channel. Such a parameter would be of policy relevance if, for instance, policy makers
consider making a program mandatory for the entire eligible population.
25I thank one of the referees for suggesting such an approach.
24and bottom 28 for the LL workers.26 This boils down to a wage cut-oﬀ of $15.5 between
LL and HL workers and $18 between HL and HH workers. The workers are re-classiﬁed
into the three skill groups, HH, HL and LL, depending on where their actual wage falls
within the cut-oﬀs.27
(iii) Once the new skill distribution has been pinned down as described above, use that in-
formation in order to compute various targets in the data that relate to high-skill and
low-skill workers and vacancies, as described in greater detail below.
5.2 Parameters Calibrated Directly from the Data
Three of the parameters representing exogenous quantities: the fraction of high-skilled labor
force η, and the job destruction rates for high-skill and low-skill, δH and δL, are chosen directly
from the data. Three more parameters: the discount factor β, the bargaining power s and
the matching parameter α, are taken from the literature. Finally, normalizations are imposed
on some search cost parameters. Table 1 reports these calibrated parameters and their values,
accompanied by more details on the calibration and data sources.
5.2.1 The Fraction of High-skill and Low-skill Individuals in the Labor Force
Given the cut-oﬀs described above, using the 1996-1999 PSID, those who are classiﬁed as HH
or HL are considered to be high-skill, while those who are classiﬁed as LL are considered to be
low-skill. This skill deﬁnition implies that 45% of the labor force is high-skilled, i.e. η = 0.45. It
is positively, but not perfectly, correlated with education. For instance, 82% of those with non-
college education are low-skill, while 18% are classiﬁed as high-skill under this skill deﬁnition.
Likewise, 87% of the college-educated are classiﬁed as high-skill under this skill deﬁnition, while
13% are classiﬁed as low-skill. This provides an education-skill conversion matrix for the labor
force which will be used later.
26Similar results can be inferred from histograms with diﬀerent bandwidths. Moreover, the analysis is for
men only, but all the results carry over when women are added to the analysis, with separate conditional wage
cut-oﬀs for women. These histograms are available upon request.
27For those who are unemployed, their predicted wage is used.
255.2.2 The Destruction Rate for High-skill and Low-skill Jobs
Data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) is used to compute the
destruction rates for high-skill and low-skill jobs. JOLTS reports job destruction rates by one-
digit industries.28 In order to convert those into high-skill and low-skill job destruction rates,
I use the wage data and wage cut-oﬀs from the PSID described above in order to compute the
fraction of high-skill and low-skill jobs in each one-digit industry. Unlike for the worker side,
where HL matches were classiﬁed as high-skill (since those are high-skill workers in low-skill
jobs), here the HL matches are counted as low-skill jobs, as it is the skill of the job that is
relevant. Therefore, I use (i) the job skill distribution in each one-digit industry, and (ii) the
relative size of each one-digit industry, in order to derive the destruction rates for high-skill
and low-skill jobs from the information available from JOLTS. This skill deﬁnition implies
a destruction rate of 10% for high-skill jobs and 11% for low-skill jobs, i.e. δH = 0.10 and
δL = 0.11.29
5.2.3 Parameters Taken from the Literature
Three more parameters − the discount factor β, workers’ bargaining power s, and the matching
parameter α − are set to values accepted in the literature. Given the quarterly time frame, the
discount factor β is calibrated to a 5% annual interest rate, resulting in β = 0.9878. Workers’
bargaining power in the Nash framework is set at s = 0.5. The matching function used here
comes from den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), who calibrate a value of α = 1.27 for the
matching parameter.
5.2.4 Normalizations and Set Parameters
The following normalizations are imposed on the parameter space. The productivity of a low-
skill job is set to one, f(L) = 1. Because of this normalization, wages and output are to
be interpreted only in a relative way. It is changes in wages and the level of output that are
28JOLTS is available from December 2000 to July 2003. The separation rates for 2001 – the year used in the
computation because it is the closest one to the time-frame here –, are very close to the separation rates for the
entire period.
29Separation rates are deﬁned as the number of total separations as a percent of total employment. To the
extent that these data include separations due to job-to-job transitions (as well as transitions out of the labor
force) for which the model does not account, these job destruction rates may overstate the total amount of job
destruction.
26relevant; the nominal values have no immediate signiﬁcance per se. There is no loss of generality
embedded in this assumption, since the magnitude of general equilibrium adjustments can be
quantiﬁed from the relative changes in nominal wages and output.
Some restrictions are imposed on the search cost parameters in the model. The beneﬁts of
being unemployed, net of search costs, are set equal on the two channels: (b − c)1 = (b − c)2.
Because a worker of given skill level has the same value functions on either channel, and because
low-skill workers can only work in low-skill jobs (whose productivity has been normalized to
one), this leads to low-skill workers having the same probability of meeting a low-skill vacancy
on either channel.30 The costs of posting vacancies are imposed to be equal between high-skill
and low-skill vacancies on the PLX, as well as equal to the cost of posting a low-skill vacancy
on the Informal channel: k2(H) = k2(L) = κ.
Since only the relative eﬃciency in matching matters across the two channels, the matching
factors of proportionality λ are set to 1 on the PLX channel (high and low-skill matching pools)
λ2H = λ2L = 1, while the matching factor of proportionality on the Informal channel, λ1, is
picked up in the calibration. For reasons discussed in the model section, we should expect that
λ1 > 1, although this restriction is not imposed ex-ante in the calibration.
5.3 Parameters Calibrated such that Model Moments Match the
Data
Seven parameters remain to be determined. They are: the productivity of a high-skill job
f(H), the beneﬁt of unemployed search net of costs b − c, the cost of posting a high-skill
vacancy on the Informal channel k1(H), all other vacancy posting costs κ, the probability that
PLX misidentiﬁes the skill type of the worker dx or of the job dy, and the matching factor of
proportionality λ1.
The parameters are computed in an exactly identiﬁed fashion by iterating on the param-
eter space until seven moments from the model match the same seven targets in the data.
These targets are: the fraction of low-skill searchers in the economy γ, the fraction of low-skill
searchers on the PLX γ2, the fraction of low-skill vacancies on the PLX φ2, the fraction of
30Furthermore, since stationarity implies that employment numbers are proportional to unemployment num-
bers with a factor of proportionality that depends on meeting probabilities, low-skill unemployment rates (un-
employed divided by employed plus unemployed) must be equal on the two channels.
27high-skill to low-skill vacancy ﬁllings on PLX
e2HH·ρH
(e2HL+e2LL)·ρL, the market tightnesses on both







. Table 2 gives the model moments used in the calibration, together
with the corresponding targets in the data.31
5.3.1 Low-skill Searchers in the Economy
Given the cut-oﬀs described above, using the 1996-1999 PSID, those unemployed workers who
are classiﬁed as HH or HL are considered to be high-skill while those who are classiﬁed as
LL are considered to be low-skill. This skill deﬁnition implies that 66% of the unemployed are
low-skill, i.e. γ = 0.66.
5.3.2 Low-skill Searchers on the PLX
The U.S Department of Labor (ETA-DOL) provides information about workers who are search-
ing on the PLX; in particular, it reports the fraction of college and non-college searchers on the
PLX. I use this information, together with the education-skill conversion matrix for unemployed
workers, to compute the fraction of searchers on the PLX who are low-skill. It implies that
75% of all searchers on the PLX are low-skill: γ2 = 0.75. All other targets related to high-skill
or low-skill searchers on the PLX are computed in a similar way.
5.3.3 The Fraction of Low-skill Vacancies on the PLX
The U.S Department of Labor (ETA-DOL) also provides information on the type of vacancies
posted on the PLX; in particular, it reports the number of vacancies (in a given period of time)
by one-digit occupations. I use the wage data and wage cut-oﬀs from the PSID described above
in order to compute the fraction of high-skill and low-skill jobs in each one-digit occupation.
Like for the industries computation, the HL matches are counted as low-skill jobs, as it is the
skill of the job that is relevant. Therefore, I use (i) the job skill distribution in each one-digit
occupation, and (ii) the relative size of each one-digit occupation, in order to derive the fraction
of high-skill and low-skill vacancies from the information available from ETA-DOL. Usually,
jobs in Professional and Managerial occupations are considered to be high-skill while jobs in the
other one-digit occupations are considered to be low-skill. Such a deﬁnition of skill is positively,
31Computation and data sources are described in the table notes.
28but not perfectly, correlated with the one I am using in my analysis. For instance, 70% of the
jobs in the Professional and Managerial occupations are high-skill while 30% get classiﬁed as
low-skill. Likewise, 77% of the jobs in the Non-professional and Non-managerial occupations
are classifed as low-skill while 23% get classiﬁed as high-skill.
This skill deﬁnition implies that 70% of the posted vacancies on the PLX are low-skill:
φ2 = 0.70. All other targets related to the high-skill or low-skill vacancies on the PLX are
computed in a similar way.
5.4 Discussion
The model matches well all of the targets, with the exception perhaps of unemployment dura-
tion, where there is a diﬀerence of about 0.3 quarters.32 The calibrated probabilities that the
PLX will make a mistake in identifying workers or vacancies are respectively 4% and 10.5%.
The calibrated matching factor on the Informal channel is λ1 = 1.431, which is larger than the
factor normalized to one on the PLX, as in order to calibrate an equilibrium with both skill
types on both channels, the Informal matching technology must have some attractive feature
to balance the sorting provided by the PLX. This attractiveness gets reﬂected by the higher
matching eﬃciency for the Informal channel, as picked up in the calibration.
Other moments generated from the model, which were not targeted in the calibration, fare
reasonably well. In terms of vacancies, the share of low-skill vacancies on the PLX, φ2, was
targeted. The low-skill share of vacancies overall was not targeted, nor were vacancies on the
Informal channel targeted. Once JOLTS data are combined with ETA-DOL data to get total
vacancies (and implicitly vacancies on the Informal channel), the statistics from the data are
similar to those computed in the model: φ = .617 in the data and φ = .591 in the model for the
share of low-skill aggregate vacancies, and φ1 = .590 in the data and φ1 = .567 in the model
for the share of low-skill Informal sector vacancies.33
The model does a good job in replicating other performance statistics reported by the PLX.
For instance, the placement rate, reported by the PLX as the fraction of workers entering
32Data used in the calibration comes from the late 1990s and early 2000s, because that was the program
year for the PLX statistics. In more recent years, unemployment durations had gone up, so that the duration
moment predicted by the model is not larger than later unemployment durations.
33Data source: JOLTS 2001 for job openings for the entire economy (channels 1 and 2 together); once weights
are applied, there are 17,995,704.86 low-skill and 11,152,295.14 high-skill vacancies (annualized ﬁgures) for the
economy, while on the PLX the numbers are 5200002.01 and 2261570.99 for low and high-skill respectively.
29employment out of those referred, is 52.2%, while the corresponding quantity generated by the
calibrated model is only slighly higher, 57.9%.34
The ratio of high-skill to low-skill wages is 1.21 in the model while it is 1.36 in the data.35
The model predicts wages w(H,H) which are too low relative to w(L,L), and conversely wages




w(L,L) are respectively 1.29 and 1.126, while in the data these are 1.546 and 1.043. In order
to match the other targets, the value picked in the calibration for f(H) = 1.27 seems to be
slightly low relative to f(L) = 1.
The model also has some diﬃculty in matching the unemployment rates data. In the model
the overall unemployment rate is 13.9%. In the data, however, unemployment rates can range
from 3.93% (for men aged 25 or more) up to 6.12% (for both genders without any age restriction
imposed).36 Besides the extremely favorable labor circumstances of late 1990s and early 2000s,
there are other potential explanations why the model fails to predict lower unemployment rates.
One is that the rather high job destruction rates include job to job transitions in the data, which
the model does not allow for. Another potential explanation is that only the unemployed are
searching in the model. To this extent, unemployment rates reﬂect the number of job searchers
in the economy rather than the genuinely unemployed. The model performs much better in
terms of the employment rate, as there is a clear immediate link between employed in the model
and employed in the data. In the PSID data the employment rate is 86.37% for men aged 25
or more, compared to the 86.10% employment rate predicted from the model.
6 General and Partial Equilibrium Impacts
6.1 Model Economy
The ﬁrst column in Table 3 gives the equilibrium outcome in the calibrated model. The next
two columns report results from the two experiments when the search channels are shut down
34Data source for PLX performance indicators: ETA9002-C; 3454759 referred workers entered employ-
ment, compared to 6613785 searching on PLX (footnote [2] from Table 2). In the model, in equilibrium
the ﬂow of job placements equals the ﬂow of job losses on each channel. Therefore, the placement rate is
(e2HHδH + e2HLδL + e2LLδL)/(u2H + u2L). Employment and unemployment levels from the model are re-
ported in Table 3.
35Data source: author’s calculations from the 1997 PSID. The corresponding regression-adjusted wage ratio
could be as low as 1.234, depending on demographic and job history controls used in the regression. The
unadjusted wage gap is higher, up to 1.547.
36Data source for unemployment and employment rates: author’s calculations from the 1997 PSID.
30one at a time. The adjustments are described in more detail in the next subsection 6.2. Un-
employment, employment, and vacancies by skill group and by channel are reported as ratios
rather than levels; total quantities remain reported in levels. The Informal channel is more
eﬃcient at overall matching (λ1 = 1.431 relative to the baseline λ2 = 1), while the PLX pro-
vides a sorting service by skill type, subject to misidentifying worker and vacancy types, with
mistake probabilities dw = 4% in identifying worker types and dv = 10.5% in identifying job
requirements.
A high-skill worker prefers to meet a high-skill vacancy, since the penalty for meeting a low-
skill vacancy is loss in output, therefore loss in surplus and wages. For a low-skill worker, to meet
a high-skill vacancy has worse consequences because such a meeting results in no productive
match being formed. Consequently, the sorting provided by the PLX is very attractive for
low-skill workers, and a larger part of the low-skill search and matching takes place on the
PLX. The ratio of low-skill to high-skill unemployed is 2.7 on the PLX and 1.8 on the Informal
channel.Vacancies follow, with similarly higher ratios of low-to-high skill vacancies: a ratio
of 2.2 of low to high vacancies listed on the PLX channel, relative to a ratio of 1.3 on the
Informal channel. In the model, the PLX channel is smaller, having a share of about 20%
of the workers’ search market (20% of employed found a jobs on the PLX, while 23% of the
unemployed searched on the PLX), and a share of about 20% of the total vacancy postings.37
The overall unemployment duration is slightly higher on the PLX because it takes longer for
high-skill workers to match with a job on the PLX.38
High-skill workers are more likely to match with a high-skill vacancy when searching on
the PLX, which results in a higher fraction of high-skill workers employed in high-skill rather
than low-skill jobs, compared to the Informal channel. Subsequently, the high-skill wage on the
PLX channel is higher than the high-skill wage on the Informal channel.39 Likewise, aggregate
average wages on the PLX are lower than on the Informal channel because of the relatively
higher fraction of low-skilled searchers on the PLX. For the same reason, that high-skill workers
37This is consistent with similar statistcis in the data; on the CPS, about 20% of workers list the PLX as
a job search method, and from the merged JOLTS and PLX statistics, 25% of the vacancies are listed on the
PLX.
38The low-skill unemployment durations on the two search channels are the same because low-skill vacancy
posting costs and workers’ search costs are the same on the two channels.
39Wages for high-skill workers in high-skill jobs are the same on the two channels, and likewise wages for high-
skill workers in low-skill jobs. The diﬀerence in the aggregate high-skill wage only comes from the diﬀerence in
the relative size of the two groups, HH and HL, on the two channels.
31are more likely to get sorted into high-skill jobs on the PLX, labor productivity is higher on
the PLX.40
Wages and value functions for employed workers indicate, as expected, that high-skill work-
ers in high-skill jobs fare the best, followed by high-skill workers in low-skill jobs, and lastly
by low-skill workers. For the ﬁrms though, low-skill jobs ﬁlled with low-skill workers generate
larger surplus than low-skill jobs ﬁlled with high-skill workers, because the wages that must be
paid to the high-skill workers are higher. The surplus for high-skill workers in low-skill jobs
is nevertheless positive, even if small: a high-skill worker maximizing discounted value utility
still ﬁnds it optimal to accept a lower paid, low-skill job with a shorter expected duration 1/δL
rather than forgo all surplus until a high-skill match can be established. Likewise for the ﬁrms,
they prefer to ﬁll a low-skill vacancy with a costlier high-skill worker rather than leave the
vacancy empty until a low-skill worker comes along.
6.2 Experiments
The second column in Table 3 provides equilibrium quantities from the simulation where the
PLX channel is shut down and everybody must search on the Informal channel, which is now
the only search channel available. Likewise, the last column in Table 3 has the results from the
simulation with the Informal channel shut down, when everyone is searching on the PLX.
6.2.1 Experiment 1: Economy without the PLX Channel
While the Informal channel is more eﬃcient in overall matching, the PLX channel, which used
to provide a sorting service, is no longer there. Consequently, more matches are formed but
relatively fewer high-skill workers match with high-skill jobs. Because of the higher fraction of
high-skill workers in low-skill jobs, the average labor productivity also goes down. The amount
of output produced by high-skill workers in high-skill jobs decreases, and the output produced
in low-skill jobs increases, because more people are employed, albeit in low-skill jobs. Aggregate
output does not increase though, because high-skill workers in low skill jobs, whose relative size
has increased, produce less than high-skill workers in high-skill jobs, whose relative size has
40The aggregate wage is w = w(H,H) · eHH/e + w(H,L) · eHL/e + w(L,L) · eLL/e. Total output is Y =
eHH ·f(H)+(eHL+eL)·f(L). The corresponding labor productivity measure of output-per-worker is y = Y/e.








x ∈ {H,L} and y ∈ {H,L}.
32decreased.
Due to the more eﬃcient matching on the Informal channel, vacancies get ﬁlled faster on the
average once the PLX is shut down. As a result average unemployment duration goes down,
ﬁrms ﬁll more vacancies, and employment goes up. While the fraction of low-skill vacancies
increases to 64.8% compared to the baseline case of 59.1%, the number of low-skill vacancies
stays roughly the same, and the adjustment comes from a decrease in the total number of
high-skill vacancies.
Unemployment incidence and duration also go down, both for high-skill and for low-skill
searchers, for several reasons: (i) the Informal channel is more eﬃcient at matching, (ii) high-
skill workers are less picky about the correct match in the absence of direct sorting, and (iii)
there are no more mistakes made in identifying low-skill searchers as high-skill ones.
High-skill workers receive slightly lower wages in the economy without the PLX, whether
they work in high-skill jobs or in low-skill jobs, while low-skill workers get a slightly higher wage.
The reason is that the economy without PLX operational has fewer high-skill vacancies and
relatively more low-skill ones; furthermore, outside options deteriorate for both skill workers
because the sorting provided by the PLX is no longer available. For high-skill workers both the
vacancies mechanism and the sorting mechanism ensure lower wages in the absence of the PLX;
for low-skill workers the mechanism from relatively more low-skill vacancies without the PLX
dominates the sorting channel, and as a result low-skill wages are higher without the PLX.
The aggregate wage is lower, because of the larger fraction of high-skill in low-skill jobs. In
comparative statics terms, an increase in wages corresponds to a proportional increase in the
value functions for workers (both employed and unemployed) and a proportional decrease in
job values.41 As a result of wage adjustments, the value of a high-skill job goes up, as does
the value of a low-skill job employing a high-skill worker, while the value of a low-skill job goes
down. The opposite adjustment occurs to the values for workers, employed and unemployed: it
goes down for the high-skill and up for the low-skill; overall, the values for workers increase.42
41The factor of proportionality is ∂W/∂w =
1−s(1−β)/B
(1−s)(1−β) for the employment value, larger ∂U/∂w = 1
(1−s)(1−β)
for the unemployment value, and negative ∂J/∂w =
−s(1−β)/B
(1−s)(1−β) for the value of a job.
42Because the bargaining parameter is set at half, s = 0.5, in equilibrium each party appropriates half of the
total surplus, that is, W(x,y)−U(x) = J(x,y) = S(x,y)/2. The changes in value functions are directly related
to the changes in wages: when the wages increase, corresponding value functions for workers go up (both the
value of work and the outside option) and the value for ﬁrms goes down. Because of the Nash rule of splitting
the surplus, it must be that changes in the outside option for workers (U) dominate the changes in the work
336.2.2 Experiment 2: Economy without the Informal Channel
For equilibrium quantities other than value functions, the reverse adjustments are true if the
Informal channel is shut down and everyone has to search on the PLX. There is more sorting
going on, because the PLX sorting service is available on the search channel, but overall match-
ing eﬃciency is lower, λ2 = 1. Waiting for the right match takes longer for high-skill workers,
who experience longer unemployment duration and incidence. Because of lower matching eﬃ-
ciency, total employment goes down, and the overall number of vacancies increases. Since all
searches are directed by PLX employees with relatively low error frequencies, a higher fraction
of high-skill workers is employed in high-skill jobs (30% high-skill workers in high-skill jobs,
compared to 23.4% in the baseline case and 17.4% in the experiment with no PLX). This leaves
fewer high-skill vacancies, while the number of low-skill vacancies increases slightly.
Compared to the baseline economy, unemployment duration is higher (1.665 quarters), but
lower than the unemployment duration on the PLX in the baseline case (1.741 quarters). While
the high-skill on PLX have the same unemployment duration in the baseline case compared to
the experiment without the Informal channel, the low-skill unemployment duration is lower in
the experiment, which correlates with a lower fraction of low-skill unemployed competing for
the low-skill jobs; 59.6% compared to 66.4% (or 72.7%) low-skill unemployed in the baseline
case, as a share of total unemployed (or share of PLX unemployed).
Due to directed matching, there are fewer poor matches of high-skill workers into low-skill
jobs and labor productivity (output per worker) is higher at 1.082 (compared to 1.05 on the
baseline case and 1.048 in the case of the experiment without the PLX). The higher productivity
also gets reﬂected in higher total output, which increases despite the reduction in the number of
employed workers. Another consequence of the improved assortative matching (fewer high-skill
workers in the lower-paying, low-skill jobs) is that the aggregate wage for high-skill workers
goes up, even as the wages for high-skill workers in high-skill jobs and in low-skill jobs each go
down.
In terms of workers’ welfare (as captured by value functions), shutting down the Informal
channel results in value functions moving in the same direction as when the PLX was shut
down: going down for high-skill workers and up for low-skill workers, only the magnitude of
value (W) so the surplus can mimic the value of the job.
34the change is larger for the decreases and smaller for the increases.As a result, on the aggregate
value functions for workers decrease. The opposite adjustments hold true for ﬁrms’ proﬁts, as
measured by the job value functions.
6.3 Program Impact Results
The implications from Table 3 are reinforced by the program impact analysis, which summarizes
some of the equilibrium adjustment and recasts them in the program evaluation terminology.
The focus is on the Treatment on the Treated (TT) impact. This is the most often estimated
parameter in the evaluation literature, as it answers the very relevant question of what is the
impact of the program for its participants. As described in Section 4, to recover the TT only
the calibrated model and the ﬁrst experiment with the PLX channel shut down are needed. The
second experiment, with the Informal channel shut down, is relevant for evaluation parameters
other than the TT. TT is computed as the diﬀerence in outcomes between the calibrated model
with agents on the PLX and the outcome from the simulation with the PLX shut down. If wages
went up in the experiment without the PLX, this would correspond to a negative impact of the
PLX on wages, since workers’ wages were higher without the PLX. Likewise, if unemployment
durations went down in the experiment without the PLX, this would correspond to a positive
impact of the PLX on unemployment durations − only in this case a positive impact implies
longer durations in the model economy, generally perceived as undesirable.
Treatment on the treated (TT) impact results are reported for wage outcomes and for un-
employment duration outcomes. Table 4 reports the impact of PLX on participants’ outcomes;
participants are individuals who search on the PLX in the baseline model. Table 5 reports the
PLX impacts for non-participants, that is, for those individuals who search on the Informal
channel in the baseline model. Impacts are reported by skill group and also on the aggregate.
The ﬁrst column gives general equilibrium impacts (discussed ﬁrst) and the second column
gives partial equilibrium impacts (discussed last).
6.3.1 General Equilibrium Impacts of the PLX
(i) The impact on participants’ wage by skill groups.
From the results in Table 4, it would seem the PLX does not help participants when looking
at the aggregate outcomes traditionally considered in evaluation: wages and unemployment
35durations. Nevertheless, the story is diﬀerent when skill heterogeneity is taken into account.
The TT general equilibrium wage impacts for high-skill workers are positive and reasonably
large, at 6.4%. For the low-skill searchers the wage impacts are small and negative: low-skill
wages are 1.5% higher in the economy without the PLX, indicating that, despite the sorting
provided by PLX, low-skill workers would actually gain a little in terms of wages if the PLX were
not available as a search option. There are two mechanisms, working in the same direction for
high-skill workers and in opposite directions for the low-skill workers: (i) all workers have better
outside options with the PLX, because of the sorting provided, and (ii) there are more high-skill
vacancies when the PLX is available, which is helpful for the high-skill, and detrimental for the
low-skill.
(ii) The impact on participants’ aggregate wage.
The impact on aggregate outcomes is not the same as the weighted impact by skill levels, as






















where the subscripts model and exp index respectively the model economy and the counterfac-
tual simulation experiment.43 As long as the ratio of high-skill to low-skill employed workers
changes between the model economy and the experiment, which it does, the impact of PLX
on the aggregate wage can be very diﬀerent from the weighted high-skill and low-skill wage
impacts; this heterogeneity is a major source of diﬀerences between the general and the partial
equilibrium impacts of the PLX. In particular, the low-skill wage decreases in the experiment
with the PLX shut down (∆w(L) < 0), and the high-skill wage impact is positive (∆w(H) > 0).
At the same time, the fraction of employed high-skill workers goes up in the experiment, which
can dampen or even negate the contribution of the high-skill wage impact in the aggregation.
Furthermore, the high-skill wage impact reported here is itself an aggregation of the wages of
high-skill working n high-skill jobs and wages of high-skill working in low-skill jobs. Movements
in the share of these two groups of high-skill workers, which are very pronounced depending
43The wage impact for high-skill (low-skill) workers is the diﬀerence in the high-skill (low-skill) wage
between the model economy and the counterfactual experiment, ∆w(H) = w(H)model − w(H)exp, and
∆w(L) = w(L)model − w(L)exp. The impact for the aggregate wage is:


















36on the availability of the PLX sorting, or lack thereof, result in large changes of the high-skill
wage impact itself.44 Likewise, the increase in the fraction of employed low-skill workers will
exacerbates the negative low-skill wage impact in aggregation. In this instance, from the large
positive wage impact for the high-skill workers of 6.4% and the small negative wage impact of
-1.5% for the low-skill workers, the aggregation produces a very small negative aggregate wage
impact of -0.5%.
(iii) The impact on participants’ unemployment duration.
From the bottom panel of Table 4, the TT general equilibrium duration impacts are positive
both for high-skill and for low-skill workers. This means that the individuals searching on the
PLX in the model economy would experience a few extra weeks of being unemployed, .456
quarters (almost 6 weeks) for the high-skill searchers and .208 quarters (2.7 weeks) for the
low-skill searchers compared to a hypothetical world with the PLX not available. Durations in
the presence of the PLX are higher because, for the high-skill workers, it is worth waiting to
be sorted into high-skill jobs, while for the low-skill workers the fraction of low-skill vacanies is
lower (compared to the experiment with the PLX shut down).
(iv) The impact of the PLX on other outcomes.
Traditional evaluation outcomes such as wages and unemployment durations do not provide
the whole picture. The PLX has a positive impact on labor productivity, which goes down from
1.065 to 1.048 in the economy without the PLX, and on total output, which goes down from
9.17 to 9.19 in the economy without the PLX. These are all relevant outcomes to be considered,
especially if policy recommendations are supposed to follow the impact analysis of the PLX.45
6.3.2 Partial Equilibrium Impacts of the PLX
The partial equilibrium impacts are reported in the last column of Tables 4 and 5. Following
the assumptions in standard evaluation literature, partial equilibrium impacts are computed
from the counterfactual experiment where PLX searchers are assigned to the Informal chan-
nel instead, with the number and skill mix of searchers and vacancies ﬁxed on the Informal
44While impacts are only reported for the aggregate high-skill wage, separate impacts for high-skill in high-
and low-skill jobs can always be inferred from the information in Table 3.
45Also, while the welfare impacts (value functions) for workers move in the same direction as the wage impacts,
the surplus, linearly and positively related to the ﬁrm value, moves in the opposite direction. It goes up for
ﬁrms oﬀering high-skill vacancies, and it goes down for ﬁrms oﬀering low-skill vacancies, reﬂecting the changes
in workers’ outside options and wages.
37channel to baseline values. Partial equilibrium adjustments in the experiment with shutting
down the PLX channel arise mostly from aggregation, given that prices for a given skill match
(HH,HL,LL) do not change. Because low-skill workers can only work in low-skill jobs, there
are no aggregation issues regarding the unemployment duration and wages of the low-skilled,
and the low-skilled partial equilibrium impacts are zero. For the high-skill, the impacts are an
aggregation over the HH and HL wage and duration impacts, and diﬀerences can only arise
because of the diﬀerent fractions of HH versus HL on the two channels.
The partial equilibrium aggregate wage impact is positive and 1.6% of the base wage, com-
pared to a negative impact of -0.5% of the base wage for the general equilibrium impact. The
partial equilibrium impacts are in line with what the literature has documented: ALMP im-
pacts, including PLX, are generally found to be small, and not always positive. Given the
range of impacts in the evaluation literature, we can not rule out that the general equilibrium
impacts are conforming to the impacts documented in the literature. Nevertheles, it is notable
that in the particular model investigated here, partial and general equilibrium wage impacts
have opposing signs.
The partial equilibrium duration impact is 1.6 weeks increase in unemployment duration
(0.128 quarters), compared to 4.17 weeks increase in duration (.321 quarters) in the general
equilibrium impact. The literature in general ﬁnds small but negative impacts on unemployment
durations (where a negative impact is a desirable one, as it reduces clients’ unemployment
durations). In this sense, the partial equilibrium impacts in the model are closer to those
documented in the literature, while the general equilibrium ones depart more from the “no
impact/small reduction in unemployment weeks” from the literature.
6.3.3 The Impact of the PLX on Non-participants
The impacts of the PLX for non-participants are reported in Table 5. These impacts are
computed, for agents initially on the Informal channel, as the diﬀerence in outcomes between
the calibrated model and the simulation with PLX shut down.46 In the standard evaluation
literature, it is assumed that the outcomes for individuals who do not participate in a program
46This should not be confused with another parameter popular in the evaluation literature, the Treatment
on the Not Treated (TNT) parameter. TNT is a diﬀerent parameter which can be recovered as the diﬀerence
in outcomes between an experiment where the Informal channel is shut down (forcing Informal searchers to go
to the PLX) and the model economy.
38(in our case Informal channel searchers who do not go to the PLX) are not aﬀected by the
program being operated, at least not beyond the initial participation decision. This assumption
is called “Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption,” or SUTVA. In our case, it imposes the
condition that the outcomes of individuals on the Informal channel should be aﬀected neither by
the presence of the PLX nor by its absence. This assumption is obviously violated by the very
nature of general equilibrium adjustments. Here, by getting a direct measure of the eﬀect of the
PLX on non-participants, we can quantify how much we depart from the SUTVA assumption.
Furthermore, note the following relationship by skill level: by construction, the partial equi-
librium impacts for participants are the diﬀerence between the general equilibrium impacts for
participants minus the general equilibrium impacts for non-participants. While this relation-
ship between partial and general equilibrium eﬀects is true by skill level, it is no longer true
on aggregate, because the skill composition changes endogenously in general equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, as SUTVA sets by assumption the equilibrium impacts of non-participants to zero,
it implicitly also sets the partial equilibrium impacts equal to the general equilibrium ones, so
the comparison between partial and general equilibrium magnitudes is equivalent to a measure
of whether SUTVA holds or not.
One very important result here is that the general equilibrium impacts of the PLX on non-
participants, assumed to be zero under SUTVA, are of similar magnitude with the impacts for
participants: 1.1% increase in wages, and 1.6 weeks (.129 quarters) increase in unemployment
duration.
Finally, all the results show remarkable heterogeneity by skill group. The high-skill workers
experience diﬀerent outcomes compared to the low-skilled ones. Furthermore, there are also
signiﬁcant changes within the high-skill outcomes themselves, due to equilibrium changes in
the fractions of high-skill workers working in high-skill jobs versus low-skill jobs.
7 Conclusion and Extensions
This paper extends the framework introduced by Albrecht and Vroman (2002), where ﬁrms
decide endogenously to create high-skill and low-skill jobs, by introducing explicitly two search
channels in the model. One is a standard random-matching Mortenssen-Pissarides type of
channel, while the other channel has a directed search component to the extent that PLX
39employers perform a screening of worker and vacancy types and facilitate the meeting among
“right” types of workers and vacancies. On the theoretical side, the approach modeled here can
be a useful tool for thinking about directed search in a diﬀerent way than for instance recent
approaches by Shi (2002) or Gonzalez and Shi (2010).
This framework is a very useful tool for quantifying general equilibrium eﬀects in the eval-
uation of the PLX program, and also for comparing general with partial equilibrium results
that are the status-quo in the current evaluation literature. General equilibrium adjustments
come from several sources: the congestion of searchers on diﬀerent channels, employers altering
the number and skill mix of the vacancies opened in the presence of the PLX, changes in the
matching opportunities and outside options for workers, and diﬀerent quality of matches. An
economy without the PLX is more eﬃcient at overall matching but less eﬃcient at sorting
worker and job skills. Consequently, if the PLX is no longer available, high-skill workers fare
worse because a larger fraction of them end up working in low-skill jobs. At the same time,
low-skill workers fare better because there are more overall matches happening, and a higher
fraction of low-skill vacancies. In the absence of PLX sorting, unemployment durations decrease
because matching on the Informal channel is more eﬃcient. Labor productivity also decreases
because of the lower match quality.
One insight yielded from these results is that researchers should use caution when interpret-
ing estimation results obtained in a partial equilibrium framework. If the program operates on
a large enough scale, as is the case of the PLX, then it is likely that the standard program eval-
uation assumption of no general equilibrium eﬀects would be violated. Once adjustments by
other actors in the economy are considered, the impact of a program can be very diﬀerent, even
opposite at times from the partial equilibrium one. Moreover, while wages and unemployment
durations remain relevant outcomes, they are not the only ones aﬀected. In the particular case
of the PLX, productivity adjustments are similarly important, and policy inference based on
counterfactuals from traditional partial equilibrium estimates may not tell the whole story.
There are several avenues that would merit further investigation. An experiment which
would shut down the PLX only for low-skill workers, prohibiting them from searching on the
PLX (while leaving this channel open for high-skill searchers) would give the counterfactual
outcome for low-skill searchers on the PLX had the PLX not been available. Such an experiment
40would produce the impact of the PLX for low-skill workers, who are the primary clients of the
PLX. The model developed here should also be a very useful framework for examining policy
implications such as mandating PLX participation for all workers and ﬁrms. Additionally, it
could be useful to see how a change in the PLX matching technology (such as a reduction in
the misidentiﬁcation probabilities) would impact on the economy. Moreover, further research
could expand the current framework to incorporate training programs that aﬀect human capital
accumulation.
41References
Adison, J., and P. Portugal (2002): “Job Search Methods and Outcomes,” Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers, (54), 505–533.
Albrecht, J., G. van den Berg, and S. Vroman (2005): “The Knowledge Lift: The
Swedish Adult Education Program That Aimed to Eliminate Low Worker Skill Levels,” IZA
Discussion Paper, (1503).
Albrecht, J., and S. Vroman (2002): “A Matching Model with Endogenous Skill Require-
ments,” International Economic Review, 43(1), 283–305.
Anderson, P. (2001): “Monitoring and Assisting Job Search,” in Labour Market Policies and
the Public Employment Service. OECD.
Bishop, J. (1993): “Improving Matches in the Labor Market,” Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, 1, 335–400.
Blundel, R., M. C. Dias, C. Meghir, and J. van Reenen (2004): “Evaluating the Em-
ployment Impact of a Mandatory Job Search Program,” Journal of the European Economic
Association, 2(4), 569–606.
Boone, J., and J. C. van Ours (2004): “Eﬀective Active Labor Market Policies,” Discussion
Paper 1335, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Burdett, K., and E. Cunningham (1998): “Toward a Theory of Vacancies,” Journal of
Labor Economics, 16(3), 445–478.
Cohen, M., and D. Stevens (1989): “The Role of the Employment Service,” In Investing
in People, Background Papers, vol.1, Final Report of the Commission on Workforce Quality
and Labor Market Eﬃciency, U.S. Department of Labor, pp. 1027-1069.
Davidson, C., and S. Woodbury (1993): “The displacement eﬀects of re-employment bonus
programs,” Journal of Labor Economics, 11(4), 575–605.
42(2000): “Crowding-out eﬀects of the Public Labor Exchange in Washington State,”
In “Measuring the eﬀect of Public Labor Exchange referrals and placements in Washington
and Oregon” by Louis Jacobson and Ian Petta, Westat.
den Haan, W. J., G. Ramey, and J. Watson (2000): “Job Destruction and Propagation
of Shocks,” The American Economic Review, 90(3), 482–498.
Fougere, D., J. Pradel, and M. Roger (2006): “Does Job-Search Assistance Aﬀect
Search Eﬀort and Outcomes? A Microeconometric Analysis of Public versus Private Search
Methods,” Mimeo.
Gonzalez, F., and S. Shi (2010): “An Equilibrium Theory of Learning, Search and Wages,”
American Economic Review, 78, 509–537.
Gregg, P., and J. Wadsworth (1996): “How Eﬀective are State Employment Agencies?
Jobcentre Use and Job Matching in Britain,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,
58(3), 443–468.
Heckman, J., L. Lochner, and C. Taber (1998): “Explaining Rising Wage Inequality:
Explorations with a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of Labor Earnings with Heteroge-
neous Agents,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 1, 1–58.
(1998b): “General Equilibrium Treatment Eﬀects: A Study of Tuition Policy,” Amer-
ican Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 88(2), 381–386.
Jacobson, L., and I. Petta (2000): “Measuring the Eﬀect of Public Labor Exchange (PLX)
Referrals and Placements in Washington and Oregon,” Discussion paper, Westat Inc. under
contract for U.S. Department of Labor, Washington DC.
Johnson, T., K. Dickinson, and R. West (1985): “An Evaluation of the Impact of
Employment Service Referrals on Applicant Earnings,” The Journal of Human Resources,
20(1), 117–137.
Katz, A. (1991): “The Length of Joblessness and the Employment Service with Special Ref-
erence to Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1979-1987,” in The Potential Eﬀec-
tiveness of the Employment Service in Serving Dislocated Workers under EDWAA: Evidence
43from the 1980s, ed. by D. C. Carol J. Romero, and A. Katz. Washington, DC: National
Commission for Employment Policy.
Lindeboom, M., J. van Ours, and G. Renes (1994): “Matching Employed Workers: an
Empirical Analysis on the Eﬀectiveness of Search,” Oxford Economics Papers, 46(1), 46–67.
Lise, J., S. Seitz, and J. Smith (2004): “Equilibrium Policy Experiments and the Evaluation
of Social Programs,” Working paper 10283, NBER.
OECD (2001): “Labour Market Policies and the Public Employment Service,” Discussion
paper.
O’Leary, C. J. (2004): “Eﬀectiveness of Labor Exchange Services,” in “Labor Exchange Ser-
vices in the United States: History, Eﬀectiveness, and Prospects” David E. Balducchi, Randall
W. Eberts and Christopher J. O’Leary, eds. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Osberg, L. (1993): “Fishing in Diﬀerent Pools: Job Search Strategies and Job-Finding Success
in Canada in the early 1980s,” Journal of Labor Economics, 11(2), 348–86.
Petrongolo, B., and C. Pissarides (2001): “Looking Into the Black Box: a Survey of the
Matching Function,” Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2), 390–431.
Roper, S. (1988): “Recruitment Methods and Vacancy Duration,” Scottish Journal of Political
Economy, 35(1), 51–64.
Shi, S. (2002): “A Directed Search Model of Inequality with Heterogeneous Skills and SkillBi-
ased Technology,” Review of Economic Studies, 69, 467–491.
van Ours, J. (1993): “Matching the Unemployed and Vacancies at the Public Employment
Oﬃce,” Empirical Economics, 19, 37–54.
van Ours, J., and G. Ridder (1993): “Vacancy Durations: Search or Selection,” Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 55(2), 189–98.
Wolpin, K., and P. Todd (2006): “Using Experimental Data to Validate a Dynamic Be-
havioral Model of Child Schooling: Assessing the Impact of a School Subsidy Program in
Mexico,” American Economic Review, 96(5), 1384–1417.
44Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Directly from data
Job destruction rate a
high skill jobs δH 0.10
low skill jobs δL 0.11
Fraction of high skilled in the labor force b η 0.45
From the literature
Discount factor β 0.987
Worker bargaining power s 0.5
Matching parameter c α 1.270
Production low skill job f(L) 1
Calibrated
Production high skill job f(H) 1.270
Matching factor λ1 1.431
Beneﬁts net of search costs (both channels) b − c 0.06
Vacancy costs, Informal channel (high-skill) k1(H) 0.404
Vacancy costs, PLX (high-skill)
and both channels (low-skill) κ 0.653
Employment Service mistakes
in identifying workers dw 0.040
in identifying vacancies dv 0.105
a Job destruction rates by industries from U.S. JOLTS
http://www.bls.gov/jlt/home.htm. The share of high-skill workers in
each industry and the share of each industry are computed by the author
from the PSID 1996-1999.
b Author’s calculations from the PSID 1996-1999. Note that a similar frac-
tion results if using the CPS Civilian Labor Force Series (LNU01000048Q,
http://www.bls.gov/cps), where the number of thousand workers in the four
quarters is 183542 college and 284862 non-college; once the skill re-weighting
matrix is applied, this translates into 210413.1 high-skill and 264290.9 low-
skill workers, and a 45% share of high-skill.
c den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000).
45Table 2: Model Moments and Data Targets
Moment Deﬁnition Model Data*
1 Low skill searchers in the economy γ = uL/u 0.66 0.66
2 Low skill searchers on PLX γ2 = u2L/u2 0.73 0.75
3 Fraction low skill vacancies on PLX φ2 = v2L/v2 0.70 0.70
4 Fraction high-skill to low-skill vacancy ﬁllings on PLX
e2HH·ρH
(e2HL+e2LL)·ρL 0.32 0.36
5 Market tightness on the high skill pool on PLX θ2H 1.36 1.36
6 Market tightness on the low skill pool on PLX θ2L 1.05 1.05
7 Unemployment duration
P uj(x)/u P
y≤x pj(x,y) 1.59 1.23
* Author’s calculations using the following data sources:
1: PSID 1996-1999
2 to 6: U.S. Department Of Labor, ETA Annual report 1999 ETA9002-C., and the education skill
conversion matrix (author’s calculation from the PSID).
7: U.S. Bureau Of Labor Statistics, CPS 1999 http://www.bls.gov/cps
http://www.doleta.gov
Weighting of workers from education to skill and of vacancies from occupation to skill is done using
weights computed by the author from PSID; see Section 5.1.
1 PSID 1996-1999.
2 ETA9002-C. 6,613,785 worker referrals by the PLX, out of which 5,843,559 non-college and 770,226
college. Applying worker skill conversion weights (author’s calculation, PSID) results in 4957461.312
low-skill and 1656323.688 high-skill referrals.
3 ETA9002-C. 7,461,573 vacancy openings received by the PLX, of which 1,120,430 professional, technical
or managerial occupations. Applying worker skill weights (author’s calculation, PSID) results in 5,200,002
low-skill and 2,261,571 high-skill vacancies.
4 ETA9002-C. 1,756,264 non-professional and non-managerial vacancies ﬁlled by the PLX, and 136,235
professional, technical and managerial vacancies ﬁlled by PLX. Applying occupation skill conversion
weights (author’s calculation, PSID) results in 1,445,881.7 low-skill and 446,617.3 high-skill occupations
ﬁlled by the PLX.
5 High-skill vacancies over high-skill worker referrals. See notes 2 and 3.
6 Low-skill vacancies over low-skill worker referrals. See notes 2 and 3.























v 0.186 0.174 0.167
Unemployment durations
duration 1H 1.037 1.050
duration 1L 1.828 1.621
duration 1 1.548
duration 2H 1.507 1.506
duration 2L 1.828 1.773
duration 2 1.741
duration 1.591 1.420 1.665
Wages
w(H,H) 1.092 1.081 1.076
w(H,L) 0.953 0.942 0.937
w(H) 1.023 0.994 1.027
w(L) 0.846 0.859 0.850






Y 0.917 0.914 0.919
Output-per-worker (productivity)
y1 = Y1/e1 1.064
y2 = Y2/e2 1.072
y = Y/e 1.065 1.048 1.082
Surplus
S(H,H) = J(H,H)/(1 − s) 3.353 3.548 3.635
S(H,L) = J(H,L)/(1 − s) 0.778 0.958 1.037
S(L) = J(L,L)/(1 − s) 2.544 2.337 2.490
overall 2.321 2.146 2.591
47Table 3: Experiments (continued)
Model Without Without
Economy PLX Informal
Value of employment for workers
W(H,H) 75.933 74.254 73.510
W(H,L) 74.645 72.959 72.211
W(L,L) 58.035 59.982 58.542
overall 66.116 66.234 65.189
Value of unemployment
U(H) 74.256 72.480 71.693
U(L) 56.763 58.814 57.297
overall 62.639 63.623 63.106






e+u 65.634 65.899 64.875
Table 4: Treatment on the Treated (TT) Wage and Unemployment
Duration Impacts for PLX participants
TT Wage impacts General eq. Partial eq.
w impact -0.004 0.015
% of base wage -0.5% 1.6%
w(H) impact 0.068 0.045
% of base wage 6.4% 4.3%
w(L) impact -0.013 0
% of base wage -1.5% 0%
Duration impacts (quarter) General eq. Partial eq.
TT duration impact 0.321 0.128
duration impact for high-skill 0.456 0.469
duration impact for low-skill 0.208 0
Table 5: Wage and Unemployment Duration Impacts for PLX non-
participants
Wage impacts General eq. Partial eq.
w impact 0.01
% of base wage 1.1% zero
w(H) impact 0.022 under
% of base wage 2.2% SUTVAa
w(L) impact -0.013
% of base wage -1.5%
Duration impacts (quarter) General eq. Partial eq.
Non-participant duration impact 0.129 zero
duration impact for high-skill -0.013 under
duration impact for low-skill 0.208 SUTVAa
a Note: Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) is the standard
assumption of no general equilibrium eﬀects, routinely employed in the eval-
uation literature.
48APPENDICES
I Matching Probabilities on the PLX Channel





(1 − dv)v2,H + dvv2,L





(1 − dv)(1 − φ2) + dvφ2
(1 − dw)(1 − γ2) + dwγ2

.





dvv2,H + (1 − dv)v2,L





dv(1 − φ2) + (1 − dv)φ2
dw(1 − γ2) + (1 − dw)γ2

.
3. Some simplifying notation: Denote at this point by Ψ and by Γ the following quantities:47
Ψ = (1 − dv)(1 − φ2) + dvφ2,
Γ = (1 − dw)(1 − γ2) + dwγ2.
The formulas for eﬀective market tightness can be written as:








With this notation, the meeting functions on the PLX channel become:48
M2,H = e u2,H · e m2,H; and































47Note that Ψ and Γ are linear equations of φ and γ respectively. If dv = 0, then Ψ = 1 − φ.
48The factor of proportionality λ2 is normalized to λ2 = 1 for the PLX, and therefore is omitted from these
formulas.

















































Therefore, the matching probabilities on the PLX channel can be re-written as:
p2(H,H) =




































































iiII Solving for the Equilibrium when Both Skill Types
Search on Both Channels (“Full-mixing” Equilibrium)
High-skill workers produce in high- or low-skill jobs; low-skill workers only produce in low-
skill jobs. Workers are indiﬀerent between searching on the Informal channel or on the PLX
channel, U1(x) = U2(x) for x = {H,L}. Likewise ﬁrms are indiﬀerent where to post vacancies
V1(y) = V2(y) for y = {H,L}. Six unknowns need to be solved for in this equilibrium: θj,
γj, and φj, with j = {1,2}. The overall quantities of interest can be computed as weighted



















The following steps give the equilibrium solution. First, re-write (24) for {y = H} and
{y = L}, respectively.





j = {1,2} (A7)















j = {1,2} (A8)
1. Eliminate U(H) between the Informal channel equations.
Using equations (23) with {j = 1},{x = H} and (A7) with {j = 1} gives the equilibrium
condition for a high-skill worker to engage in a productive match on the Informal channel:
k1(H) =
q1(H,H)
BH β(1 − s)
[f(H) − (b − c1)] + βs
p1(H,L)







2. Eliminate U(H) between the PLX channel equations.
Using equations (23) with {j = 2},{x = H} and (A7) with {j = 2} gives the equilibrium
condition for a high-skill worker to engage in a productive match on the PLX channel:
k2(H) =
q2(H,H)
BH β(1 − s)
[f(H) − (b − c2)] + βs
p2(H,L)







iii3. Eliminate U(L) between the Informal channel equations.
Using equations (23) with {j = 1},{x = L} and A8 with {j = 1} gives the equilibrium




f(L) − (b − c1)
BL + βsp1(L,L)
β(1−s) (A11)
4. Eliminate U(L) between the PLX channel equations.
Using equations (23) with {j = 2},{x = L} and (A8) with {j = 2} gives the equilibrium








f(L) − (b − c2)
BL + βsp2(L,L)
β(1 − s) (A12)
5. Eliminate U(H) between equations for the Informal and PLX channels.
Using equations (A7) with {j = 1} and (A7) with {j = 2} gives the equilibrium condition








6. Eliminate U(L) between equations for the Informal and PLX channels.
Using equations (23) with {j = 1},{x = L} and (23) with {j = 2},{x = L} gives the
equilibrium condition for a low-skill worker to be indiﬀerent between searching on the
Informal channel or the PLX:50
BL(b − c1) + βsp1(L,L)f(L)
BL + βsp1(L,L)
=
BL(b − c2) + βsp2(L,L)f(L)
BL + βsp2(L,L)
(A14)
Equations (A9) to (A14) give the solution for the full-mixing equilibrium.
49Note that in the special case when k1(H) = k2(H) = k(H), the full-mixing equilibrium is satisﬁed iﬀ
the probabilities that a high skill worker meets a high-skill vacancy are the same on the two channels, i.e.
q1(H,H) = q2(H,H).
50To capture the fact that high-skill workers and low-skill workers are indiﬀerent between searching on either
channel, the complementary set of equations could have been used instead: (23) with {j = 1},{x = H} and
(23) with {j = 2},{x = H} for high-skill and (A8) with {j = 1} and (A8) with {j = 2} for low-skill. The
results should obviously be the same.
ivII.1 Other Quantities: Computing Employment, Wages and Output
from the Equilibrium Solution
The ﬂow equilibrium conditions (6) to (8) do not yield any relationship between γ and φ in
this mixing equilibrium solution. They nevertheless give solutions for unemployment on the
two channels. Using the following identities:
ujH = (1 − γj)uj and ujL = γjuj j = {1,2} (A15)
and the equilibrium ﬂow equations, one can obtain the measures of employment on each channel,
e1 = e1H + e1L and e2 = e2H + e2,L:
δ ej = {(1 − γj)[pj(H,H) + pj(H,L)] + γjpj(L,L)}uj for j = {1,2} (A16)
In the cross-skill equilibrium, not all of the employed high-skill workers work in high-skill jobs.
In this case,
δ ejHy = pj(H,y)ujH for j = {1,2}, y = {H,L} (A17)
gives the measure of high-skill workers employed in, respectively, high skill y = H or low-skill
y = L jobs.
Once the equilibrium quantities θ, γ and φ have been computed, as well as the implied
meeting probabilities, then (A15) and (A16) provide the solution for the employment and
unemployment equilibrium quantities. Vacancies are also immediate to compute, as v = θu.
Wages can be solved for using (21) and (23).51
f(y) − w(x,y) = (1 − s)
(
f(y) −











for x = {H,L}, y = {H,L}, x ≥ y (A18)
Note that f(H) > f(L) ⇒ w(H,H) > w(H,L).52
The wage of low-skill workers simpliﬁes to:
f(L) − w(L,L) = (1 − s)
B[f(L) − (b − cj)]
B + βspj(L,L)
.
51Equations (A7) and (A8) could have been used instead of (23) to compute equilibrium wages.
52In general, it is diﬃcult to say if w(H,L) > w(L,L) or even if w(H,H) > w(L,L), unless the meeting
probabilities are clearly better for high-skill workers. The exception is the corner separating equilibrium with
all agents on the Informal channel, where it can be unambiguously shown that w(H,H) > w(H,L) > w(L,L).
vTotal output in the economy is given by:
Y = eH · f(H) + eL · f(L) =
X
j={1,2}
ejHH · f(H) + (ejHH + ejL) · f(L),
where employment formulas follow from (A16) and (A17).
Start from (7) and (8):
e1H + e2H + u1H + u2H = η
e1L + e2L + u1L + u2L = 1 − η
Substitute for e1x + ePx from summing equation (6) when {j = 1} and when {j = 2},
separately for x = H and x = L, to get expressions for unemployment.
u1 =
δηγ2(p2(LL) + δ) − δ(1 − η)(1 − γ2)(p2(HH) + p2(HL) + δ)
(1 − γ1)γ2(p1(HH) + p1(LH) + δ)(p2(LL) + δ) − γ1(1 − γ2)(p1(LL) + δ)(p2(HH) + p2(HL) + δ)
u2 =
δηγ1(p1(LL) + δ) − δ(1 − η)(1 − γ1)(p1(HH) + p1(LH) + δ)
(1 − γ2)γ1(p2(HH) + p2(HL) + δ)(p1(LL) + δ) − γ2(1 − γ1)(p2(LL) + δ)(p1(HH) + p1(LH) + δ)
The inequalities that need to be satisﬁed in this case come from the condition that engaging
in a productive match upon meeting is worthwhile, f(y) > w(x,y). Note from (21) and
f(H) > f(L) that if the condition for a high-skill worker to take a low-skill job is satisﬁed, it
implies that the high-skill worker would take a high-skill job as well. Therefore, there are only
two relevant conditions: f(L) > w(H,L) and f(L) > w(L,L).
On the Informal channel, the two inequalities can be written as:
f(L) > w(H,L) ⇔ B
L[f(L) − (b − c1)] − βsm(θ1)(1 − φ1)[f(H) − f(L)] > 0 (A19)
f(L) > w(L,L) ⇔ B
L[f(L) − (b − c1)] > 0 (A20)
On the PLX channel, the two inequalities can be written as:
f(L) > w(H,L) ⇔ B
H[f(L) − (b − c2)] > βsp2(H,H)[f(H) − f(L)] (A21)
f(L) > w(L,L) ⇔ f(L) − (b − c2) > 0 (A22)
By assumption, f(H) > f(L). Therefore, (A19) ⇒ (A20), and thus (A20) is not binding.
Likewise, (A22) ⇒ (A21), and thus (A21) is not binding. This result is consistent with
the stronger statement that w(H,L) > w(L,L), although to show that the wage inequality
w(H,H) > w(H,L) > w(L,L) holds in all cases extra assumptions are needed.53 Therefore,
(A19) and (A22) are the relevant inequalities in the full-mixing equilibrium.
53The only statement that can be made unambiguously in this case is that w(H,H) > w(H,L). Without
viIII Solving for the Corner Solution when All Agents Mi-
grate to One Channel (“Separating” Equilibrium)
The solution for the separating equilibria is reciprocally the same, regardless whether workers
migrate to the Informal or to the PLX channels.
1. Segregating on the Informal Channel.
All workers ﬁnd it optimal to migrate to the Informal channel, U1(x) > U2(x), for
x = {H,L}. Vacancies follow. There are no workers or vacancies on the PLX channel.
Subscript “inf” denotes the entire population of searchers and vacancies, u1 = u and
v1 = v. There are three unknown quantities that this equilibrium has to solve for: θ1, γ1,
and φ1.
2. Segregating on the PLX Channel.
All workers and vacancies migrate to the PLX channel, U1(x) < U2(x) for x = {H,L}
Subscript “plx” denotes the entire population of searchers and vacancies, u2 = u and
v2 = v. There are three unknown quantities that this equilibrium has to solve for: θ2, γ2,
and φ2.
Two of the equilibrium equations come from the conditions that high-skill and low-skill
workers engage in productive matches. Therefore, for the Informal channel these are equations
(A9) and (A11) derived for the mixing equilibrium. For the PLX channel, they are equations
(A10) and (A12). The third equation in solving the separating equilibrium comes from equi-
librium ﬂow equations. From (7) and (8) we have that eH + uH = η and eL + uL = 1 − η.
Substitute these back into (6) to get:












for j = {1,2}
further assumptions, the possibility that w(H,L) < w(L,L) cannot be ruled out. The model has diﬀerent
implications from those of Albrecht and Vroman’s (2000). In their case, w(H,H) > w(H,L) > w(L,L) unam-
biguously and the model can explain “between” and “within” wage inequality. A side product of my model
is a weakening of the result in Albrecht and Vroman, in the sense that extra assumptions are needed for
w(H,H) > w(H,L) > w(L,L) to hold in all cases.
viiFrom γj =
uL




















for j = {1,2} (A23)
(A9), (A11), and (A23) give the solution for θ1 and for γ1 = γ1(θ1) and φ1 = φ1(θ1). (A10),
(A12), and (A23) give the solution for θ2 and for γ2 = γ2(θ2) and φ2 = φ2(θ2).
There are ﬁve inequalities that the parameters need satisfy in the separating equilibrium.
The ﬁrst three inequalities say that the value of a productive match on the PLX channel is
higher than the outside options, f(y) > w(x,y). As in the mixing equilibrium, this leads to
one inequality only (A22) that needs to be satisﬁed.
The next two inequalities follow from:
U(x) = U1(x) > U2(x) ⇔
X
y≤x





for x = {H,L} (A24)
with x = H and x = L. Inequalities A24 have to be in reverse order for the model to be
consistent with the PLX channel being always chosen over the Informal channel.























Low-skill workers choose the PLX channel if
pj(L,L)
BL f(L) ≥ (b − cj)
pj(L,L)









Note that, since they depend on equilibrium results, it is possible that inequalities (A25) and
(A26) are satisﬁed both when all agents migrate to the Informal channel and when they migrate
to the PLX channel. Moreover, depending on the sign of c2 − c1, only one of these inequalities
will be binding. The inequalities that have to be satisﬁed for a separating equilibrium to hold
are therefore (A22), (A25), and (A26).
viiiIV Solving for the Corner Solution when High-skill Work-
ers Migrate to the Informal Channel and Low-skill
Workers Migrate to the PLX Channel (“Partial-mixing”
Equilibrium)
In this equilibrium, all high-skill workers ﬁnd it optimal to migrate to the Informal channel,
while all low-skill workers search for jobs on the PLX channel, U1(H) > U2(H), and U1(L) <
U2(L). Therefore, u1,L = u2,H = 0. It follows that γ1 = 0 and γ2 = 1. Moreover, u2,H = 0 ⇒
q2(H,H) = q2(H,L) = 0 and therefore v2,H = 0 and φ2 = 1. Thus, only three unknowns still
need to be determined in this equilibrium: θ1, θ2, and φ1.
From equation (24), noting that q1(L,L) = 0 and q1(H,H) =
m(θ1)
θ1 , one can get:






Equation (A27) gives an analytical solution for θ1. Note that in order for this equilibrium to
be feasible, it must be that k1(H) > k1(L). The second equation comes from (A9). Replacing



















− [f(H) − (b − c1)]

(A28)
Equation (A12) with q2(H,L) = is used in obtaining the solution for the last unknown, φ2:
k2(L)





where φ2 enters via p2(L,L) and q2(L,L). Therefore, equations (A27), (A28) and (A29) ﬁnish
the solution for this equilibrium.
The relevant inequalities that need to be satisﬁed in this equilibrium derive from the fol-
lowing conditions: f(H) > w(H,H) and f(L) > w(H,L) on the Informal channel (the ﬁrst is
not binding, the second is inequality (A19)); f(L) > w(L,L) on the PLX channel (inequality
(A21)); high-skill workers choose the Informal channel (inequality (A25) with a reversed sign);
and ﬁnally low-skill workers choose the PLX channel (inequality (A26)).
ixV Sensitivity analysis
Tables A-1 and A-2 report the sensitivity of equilibrium moments, as well as the sensitivity of
general and partial equilibrium impacts, to small changes of parameters around their equilib-
rium values. In particular, each parameter is (i) increased and then (ii) decreased by 1% around
its calibrated value. Table A-1 reports quantity adjustmenst from chaning the calibrated pa-
rameters dx, dy, f(H), b−c1 = b−c2, k1H and k1L = k2H = k2L; Table A-2 reports sensitivity
for λ1, β, s, α1, eta, and rhoH and rhoL.54
The top panel of each table reports sensitivity results for the equilibrium moments. The
“Baseline” column gives the equilibrium moments originally reported in Table 2 in the text.
The bottom panel has sensitivity results for the general and partial equilibrium impacts on
wages and unemployment duration. The “Baseline” column present the general equilibrium
impacts and partial equilibrium impacts initially reported in Tables 4 and 5 in the text.
While the equilibrium moments from the model change very little with the 1% change in pa-
rameter values, in all instances the changes go inthe right direction direction: if a moment goes
up when a parameter increases by 1% then the same moment goes down when that parameter
decreses by 1% – and vice-versa, if the moment goes down when a parameter increases, it goes
up when the parameter decreases. The parameters which result in the largest changes are λ1,
the matching eﬃciency of channel 1, and the discount factor β (which was calibrated to a 5%
interest rate). Their marginal eﬀect on model moments is the opposite: for instance, when λ1
goes up by 1%, unemployment duration and high-to-low skill placement rates increase, while
all other moments used in calibration (share of low-skill unemployed in the economy and on
the PLX, share of low-skill vacancies on the PLX, and the two market tghtness on the PLX)
decrease; the opposite adjustments occur from a 1% increase in β. The eﬀect from a 1% change
in the high-skill job productivity f(H) is also substantive. The eﬀect from a 1% change in
the other parameters is either small or very small, but nevertheless the changes go in the right
direction: if they go up (down) when a parameter is increased, they go down (up) when that
parameter is decreased.
The same holds true for the sensitivity of general and partial equilibrium impacts to param-
54In the last set of parameters, in calibration s and α1 were set to values from the literature and eta, rhoH
and rhoL were calibrated directly from the data.
xeter changes of 1% around equilibrium values. Most of the changes in impacts are small, with
the exception of the sensitivity on λ1, β, f(H), and κ, when the change in impacts is larger.
In all cases, nevertheless, the changes go in the expected direction: if an impact increases (de-
creases) when a parameter goes up, the same impact decreases (increases) when that parameter
goes down.
xiTable A-1: Sensitivity to 1% change (increase and decrease) in parameters
BASELINE dx dy f(H) b − c k1H k1L = k2H = k2L
Main moments up down up down up down up down up down up down
unemp. dur. 1.591 1.592 1.590 1.594 1.588 1.576 1.619 1.592 1.590 1.591 1.591 1.603 1.574
γ =
uL
u 0.664 0.664 0.664 0.664 0.664 0.668 0.656 0.664 0.664 0.663 0.665 0.664 0.664
γ2 =
u2L
u2 0.727 0.726 0.728 0.724 0.730 0.753 0.691 0.727 0.727 0.729 0.725 0.721 0.736
Φ2 0.693 0.691 0.694 0.688 0.696 0.719 0.653 0.693 0.693 0.695 0.689 0.684 0.703
θ2H 1.365 1.364 1.366 1.365 1.365 1.386 1.343 1.365 1.365 1.365 1.365 1.349 1.390
θ2L 1.050 1.051 1.049 1.050 1.050 1.044 1.057 1.050 1.050 1.049 1.051 1.038 1.067
Plcmt.rt. H/L 0.314 0.316 0.312 0.321 0.309 0.269 0.387 0.316 0.315 0.311 0.32 0.328 0.297
Wage impacts: ge
TT w -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.011 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007
TT wH 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.067 0.068 0.068 0.067 0.067 0.068 0.069 0.066
TT wL -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012
non-p w 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
non-p wH 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.021
non-p wL = TT wL
Wage impacts: pe
TT w 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014
TT wH 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.045
TT wL = 0
Duration impacts: ge
TT dur 0.3205 0.3210 0.3200 0.3216 0.3196 0.3204 0.3213 0.3206 0.3208 0.3188 0.3219 0.3252 0.3136
TT dur H 0.4563 0.4570 0.4557 0.4564 0.4563 0.4475 0.4659 0.4564 0.4564 0.4555 0.4573 0.4599 0.4510
TT dur L 0.2075 0.2084 0.2066 0.2106 0.2048 0.1994 0.2213 0.2080 0.2080 0.2046 0.2103 0.2154 0.1968
non-p dur 0.1283 0.1287 0.1279 0.1298 0.1269 0.1303 0.1289 0.1287 0.1287 0.1245 0.1319 0.1343 0.1199
non-p dur H -0.0127 -0.0127 -0.0127 -0.0129 -0.0126 -0.0123 -0.0135 -0.0128 -0.0126 -0.0124 -0.0131 -0.0136 -0.0117
Duration impacts: pe
TT dur 0.1279 0.1285 0.1273 0.1297 0.1264 0.1138 0.1482 0.1281 0.1279 0.1268 0.1296 0.1323 0.1223
TT dur H 0.4690 0.4696 0.4684 0.4693 0.4689 0.4599 0.4794 0.4690 0.4690 0.4679 0.4704 0.4735 0.4627
x
i
iTable A-2: Sensitivity to 1% change (increase and decrease) in paraneters
BASELINE λ1 β s α1 η ρH,ρL
Main moments up down up down up down up down up down up down
unemp. dur 1.591 1.613 1.536 1.541 1.694 1.608 1.576 1.580 1.603 1.585 1.597 1.597 1.586
γ =
uL
u 0.664 0.661 0.667 0.669 0.641 0.664 0.664 0.665 0.663 0.662 0.667 0.663 0.665
γ2 =
u2L
u2 0.727 0.699 0.789 0.775 0.649 0.725 0.728 0.730 0.724 0.727 0.727 0.722 0.732
Φ2 0.693 0.657 0.766 0.748 0.602 0.690 0.694 0.696 0.688 0.693 0.693 0.686 0.698
θ2H 1.365 1.363 1.427 1.429 1.309 1.340 1.391 1.368 1.362 1.365 1.365 1.360 1.371
θ2L 1.050 1.053 1.070 1.072 1.033 1.030 1.070 1.051 1.048 1.050 1.050 1.047 1.052
Plcmt.rt. H/L 0.314 0.374 0.205 0.228 0.491 0.319 0.312 0.309 0.321 0.314 0.314 0.325 0.305
Wage impacts: ge
TT w -0.005 0.003 -0.020 -0.017 0.017 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.006
TT wH 0.067 0.072 0.056 0.060 0.077 0.068 0.067 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.068 0.068 0.067
TT wL -0.012 -0.015 -0.009 -0.010 -0.016 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012
non-p w 0.010 0.012 0.005 0.006 0.015 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.010
non-p wH 0.022 0.026 0.017 0.020 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.022
non-p wL = TT wL
Wage impacts: pe
TT w 0.015 0.017 0.010 0.011 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014
TT wH 0.045 0.047 0.039 0.040 0.050 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.045
TT wL = 0
Duration impacts: ge
TT dur 0.3205 0.3380 0.2915 0.3086 0.3326 0.3254 0.3151 0.3181 0.3226 0.3178 0.3231 0.3217 0.3194
TT dur H 0.4563 0.4685 0.4278 0.4390 0.4721 0.4598 0.4531 0.4533 0.4595 0.4569 0.4559 0.4578 0.4547
TT dur L 0.2075 0.2409 0.1530 0.1782 0.2565 0.2133 0.2014 0.2046 0.2104 0.2004 0.2146 0.2110 0.2046
non-p dur 0.1283 0.1469 0.1068 0.1219 0.1451 0.1320 0.1247 0.1274 0.1294 0.1259 0.1311 0.1295 0.1278
non-p dur H -0.0127 -0.0145 -0.0097 -0.0111 -0.0154 -0.0134 -0.0122 -0.0125 -0.0129 -0.0123 -0.0133 -0.0130 -0.0126
Duration impacts: pe
TT dur 0.1279 0.1455 0.0925 0.1012 0.1712 0.1299 0.1265 0.1258 0.1305 0.1281 0.1281 0.1310 0.1252
TT dur H 0.4690 0.4830 0.4375 0.4501 0.4875 0.4731 0.4652 0.4658 0.4724 0.4691 0.4691 0.4708 0.4673
x
i
i
i